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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
New York’s Clean Energy Standard (“CES”), adopted in August 2016, aims to steer the
state’s electricity sector away from carbon-intensive generation sources. It supports low-carbon
alternatives by requiring retail electricity suppliers to purchase credits, the proceeds from which
are paid to renewable and nuclear generators. Recognizing that this will affect the operation of
wholesale electricity markets, New York’s electric transmission grid operator (the “New York
Independent System Operator” or “NYISO”) has commenced a review to assess possible means of
incorporating the cost of carbon emissions into market prices. This would be a departure from the
norm insofar as the cost of emissions is not directly valued in wholesale electricity markets. In
another respect, however, NYISO’s review is not unusual: three of the six other wholesale electric
grid operators in the U.S. are considering how best to handle greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions
pricing, 1 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has called for a technical
conference to address issues arising from state-level policies that address emissions directly and
indirectly.2
NYISO is currently developing a white paper which will analyze the pros and cons of
various carbon pricing schemes. To inform NYISO’s analysis, this paper explores two approaches
to carbon pricing: the first would involve NYISO adopting a carbon price of its own initiative with
a view to improving the operation of wholesale electricity markets (“Approach 1”), while the
second would involve adoption of a carbon price designed to reflect and harmonize state-level
policies aimed at reducing electricity sector emissions (“Approach 2”). Under either approach,
NYISO would adopt a per megawatt hour carbon price and use it to establish a fee for each
generating unit, consistent with its emissions profile. This fee would be added to the prices
generators bid into the wholesale electricity market and those adjusted prices used by NYISO to
See ISO New England, NEPOOL 2016 IMAPP Proposals Observations, Issues, and Next Steps 2
(Jan. 2017), https://perma.cc/C238-FZQN; California ISO, Regional Integration California
Greenhouse Gas Compliance and EIM Greenhouse Gas Enhancement Straw Proposal (Dec. 1,
2016), https://perma.cc/D5E3-UGHG; Stu Bresler, PJM, Potential Alternative Approach to Expanding
the Minimum Offer Price Rule to Existing Resources, GRID 20/20 (Aug. 11, 2016),
https://perma.cc/M7YG-7BWW.
1

Rebecca Kern, How Markets Adapt to State Energy Plans Topic of FERC Meeting, BLOOMBERGBNA,
Feb. 14, 2015, http://bit.ly/2kTMShq.
2
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determine the dispatch order. The result would likely be a re-ordering of dispatch, with highemitting generators dispatched (and paid) less frequently, and cleaner alternatives more
frequently.
Our proposal, while conceptually simple, is likely to be difficult to implement. Key issues
that must be addressed before its adoption and implementation include:


Design: NYISO could derive a carbon price from the social cost of carbon (“SCC”). Developed
using technical models with significant public input, the SCC is a robust metric that is
consistent with the carbon prices currently used elsewhere in the electricity sector. Despite this,
however, its use may be opposed by some industry and other groups on the grounds that it
reflects the economy-wide costs of climate change, not just costs imposed on electric grid
operations. .



Ensuring fairness for generators: Whether NYISO derives its carbon price from the SCC or
another touchstone, care must be taken to ensure that it does not duplicate other carbon pricing
schemes. Some generators bidding into NYISO markets are already subject to carbon pricing
through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), a cap-and-trade program, under
which large fossil fuel generators are required to purchase emissions allowances at prices set
by auction. To ensure that those generators are not required to pay twice for the same
emissions, the RGGI auction price should be deducted from the carbon fee NYISO would add
to their bids. The carbon fee may also need to be adjusted to account for the value of zeroemission credits paid to nuclear generators under tier 3 of the CES.



Mitigating consumer impacts: Adoption of a carbon pricing scheme by NYISO would likely
lead to an increase in wholesale electricity prices, at least in the short term. To offset this
increase, revenues generated through carbon pricing should be refunded to retail electricity
suppliers in an equitable manner, not tied to their specific purchases. We recommend that New
York direct its retail suppliers to pass refunds through to their customers. This will be
important to mitigate end-customer bill impacts.


Providing legal justification: Any NYISO carbon pricing scheme would be subject to
review by FERC. The Federal Power Act confers broad authority on FERC to shape
wholesale electricity markets to ensure that they produce just and reasonable rates. This
paper presents arguments supporting the view that incorporating a carbon price into

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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wholesale electricity rates – under either Approach 1 or Approach 2 - would be just and
reasonable. We acknowledge, however, that Approach 1 would push the boundaries of
past market regulation, though in ways that are consistent with the law and with FERC
practice. Approach 2 would fit more comfortably within the existing boundaries of FERC’s
authority to strike a balance between respecting state-level public policy and ensuring the
smooth operation of wholesale markets.


Arguments supporting Approach 1:
-

Enhancing competition in wholesale energy markets: FERC takes the view that
carefully designed competitive wholesale markets will produce just and reasonable
rates. The current failure to price carbon undermines the competitiveness of
markets and, more specifically, low-carbon generators’ participation in those
markets. Adopting a carbon price, based on the SCC, would level the playing field
for all market participants and would be wholly consistent with FERC’s past efforts
to improve the functioning of markets.

-

Ensuring proper wholesale price formation: FERC has emphasized that, to provide
the correct incentives for investment, wholesale electricity rates must reflect the cost
of generation. Currently, however, market-based rates do not reflect the cost of
carbon dioxide emissions and associated climate change. Climate change will
impair generation and transmission facility efficiency, undermining reliability and
imposing costs on market participants which must be reflected in rates so as to
provide correct incentives for investment in new facilities. As the SCC would exceed
costs to market participants, its use could not be justified solely by this argument.
Considered in isolation, this argument would justify a lower carbon price, based on
costs to market participants.



Arguments supporting Approach 2:
-

Align wholesale markets with state-level public policy for the short- and longterm: New York has adopted several policies in service to its goal of decarbonizing
the electricity sector, including three that impose disparate prices on a patchwork of
generators. It has also articulated long-term targets for emissions reductions that
will not be achieved without the adoption of further specific policy measures in the
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future. A carbon pricing scheme that rationalizes existing public policy and
anticipates foreseeable changes to that public policy would respect state authority
while also ensuring that wholesale markets operate efficiently and send accurate
signals to market participants and investors. Notably, such a scheme would also
reinforce FERC’s goals for improving transmission planning, in part by encouraging
greater attention to non-transmission alternatives. It should be noted that the facts
underlying this argument would also support Approach 1.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As part of its ongoing efforts to combat climate change, New York has committed to
reducing statewide greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions by forty-percent below 1990 levels by 2030
(the “40 by 30 goal”). The bulk of emissions reductions are expected to come from the electricity
sector, with the state aiming to secure fifty percent of its electricity needs from zero-emitting
renewable generators. Consistent with this goal, the state’s Clean Energy Standard (“CES”)
requires retail electricity suppliers (“Load Serving Entities” or “LSEs”) to purchase Renewable
Energy Credits (“RECs”), the proceeds from which will be paid to renewable generators. The CES
also requires LSEs to obtain Zero-Emission Credits (“ZECs”), which compensate nuclear
generators for their zero-emission attributes.
Prompted in part by adoption of the CES, the New York Independent System Operator
(“NYISO”), a non-profit corporation which oversees electricity transmission and wholesale sales in
New York, has commenced a review into whether and how policies that assign values to
generators’ zero-emission attributes and to GHG emissions should be priced in wholesale
electricity markets. During the first quarter of 2017, NYISO will release a white paper, analyzing
various emissions pricing schemes. This paper is intended to inform NYISO’s analysis and, to that
end, explores two approaches to emissions pricing in wholesale markets.
Wholesale electricity markets have generally treated GHG emissions as a wholly exogenous
externality of generation, to be addressed—if they are to be addressed at all—through
environmental policy tools such as pollution control laws or temporary emerging-market subsidies
for the nascent renewables industry. 3 In our view, however, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) has authority to approve a NYISO tariff that prices-in emissions insofar as it
(a) merely makes way for or harmonizes public policy at the state level, or (b) can by shown to
improve the functioning of wholesale markets to ensure just and reasonable rates. These two legal

See Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“potential siting,
health, safety, environmental or archeological problems are beyond the Commission’s authority to
consider under sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act”).
3
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paths to emissions pricing are not mutually exclusive, but they are distinct and would have
implications for the approach taken by NYISO.
Both paths are rooted in the authority conferred by the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), which
empowers FERC to shape wholesale electricity markets and steer transmission planning to ensure
that the bulk power system delivers reliable electricity services for just and reasonable rates.
Although FERC has not previously relied on this authority to price GHG emissions, neither the
FPA’s capacious language nor the judicial decisions that have interpreted it prevent such a step.
Indeed, as explained below, we read existing authority as all but commanding that wholesale
markets be reconfigured to better account for the costs of emissions.
The authors recognize that one of our proposed paths to pricing emissions—which would
see NYISO adopting an emissions price of its own initiative with a view to improving the
operation of wholesale electricity markets—would push the boundaries of what has to date been
considered the limit of FERC’s authority. Many view climate change as an environmental
externality whose attendant costs lay beyond the scope of what ought to inform FERC’s
assessment of wholesale rates’ justness and reasonableness. 4 We argue, however, that climate
change and the GHG emissions that cause it materially affect the wholesale energy market. The
carbon pricing scheme we propose would ensure those effects are properly accounted for in
market prices. The proposal would, like several other recent orders, enhance competition and
improve price formation,. It would also support effective planning.
The fact that the FPA does not expressly authorize emissions pricing in wholesale markets
is not fatal. FERC has, in the past, taken steps not contemplated in the FPA. The establishment of
wholesale markets is a good example. At the time the FPA was enacted, electricity services were
provided by vertically integrated utilities. Markets evolved gradually over time, as a result of

See Todd S. Aagard, Energy-Environment Policy Alignments, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1546 (2015)
(“Broadening FERC’s authority to encompass externalities and other market failures . . . would
fundamentally re-orient the agency in ways that would likely generate significant opposition from
both inside and outside the agency—and perhaps from courts as well.”); John S. Moot, Subsidies,
Climate Change, Electric Markets and the FERC, 35 ENERGY L. J. 345 (2014) (stating without
explanation that ignoring generators’ GHG emissions is “fuel-neutral”); Eric Filipink, Serving the
“Public Interest” — Traditional vs Expansive Utility Regulation, NRRI Rep. No. 10-02 (Dec. 30,
2009), https://perma.cc/UMU7-WKXN (discussing aspects of issue in retail market context).
4
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various FERC actions, beginning with the adoption of Order 888 in 1996. That order laid the
groundwork for competitive energy markets by requiring utilities to provide “open access”
transmission services to unaffiliated generators. The order is widely considered a response to the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, which authorized FERC to order individual utilities to provide
transmission services on a case-by-case basis. Crucially, however, it is the FPA and not the 1992
Act that provides the legal basis for FERC’s creation of wholesale markets. 5 Indeed, FERC went
beyond what the 1992 Act required after recognizing that the process it prescribed would be too
costly and time-consuming to ensure just and reasonable rates. 6
This paper proceeds as follows: Parts 2, 3, and 4 provide background on electricity
infrastructure, wholesale markets, and carbon pricing respectively—topics that are likely familiar
for some readers. Part 5 briefly discusses New York State’s current carbon pricing programs, which
are designed to operate outside the wholesale electricity market. Part 6 explores mechanisms
NYISO could employ to implement a carbon price in the wholesale market. And Part 7 offers
arguments that could be presented in support of a NYISO carbon price proposal to FERC.

2. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 101
Electricity services were historically provided by vertically-integrated utilities, which
owned generating units, as well as transmission and distribution infrastructure. Each utility
operated as a regulated monopoly, selling electricity within an exclusive service territory.
Regulation of electricity sales was—and still is—shared between the federal government and the
states. At the federal level, FERC is authorized to regulate the transmission and wholesale sale of
electricity in interstate commerce under the FPA.7 The FPA defines wholesale sales as sales of

New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 11 (2002) (“Rather than grounding its legal authority [to issue
Order 888] in Congress' more recent electricity legislation, FERC cited §§ 205-206 of the 1935 FPAthe provisions concerning FERC's power to remedy unduly discriminatory practices-as providing
the authority for its rulemaking. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-824e.”).
5

Id.
16 U.S.C. § 824(a) - (b) (providing for federal regulation of the “transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce and . . . the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce”).
6
7
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electricity “to any person for resale.”8 Those sales are considered to occur in “interstate commerce”
whenever electricity is transmitted via an interstate grid. 9 Where transmission occurs via an
intrastate grid, the sale is not subject to regulation by FERC, but may be regulated by the state in
which it occurs. The states also regulate retail electricity sales.
All electricity sold in the contiguous U.S. is transmitted via three synchronous grids,
namely:
1. the Eastern Interconnection, which extends from central Canada south to Florida and includes
all U.S. territory east of the Great Plains, except parts of Texas and Maine;
2. the Western Interconnection, which extends from western Canada south to Mexico and
includes all U.S. territory west of the Great Plains; and
3. the Texas Interconnection, which covers most of Texas.
As the Eastern and Western Interconnections cross state borders, electricity transmission
thereon is considered to occur in interstate commerce, making it subject to regulation by FERC.
FERC’s regulatory duties include ensuring wholesale electricity rates are just and reasonable and
not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and that the bulk power system operates reliably.10

8

Id. § 824(d).

9

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 452 (1972).

16 U.S.C. §§ 842d(a) (requiring “all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public
utility for . . . [the] sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . shall be
just and reasonable and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared
to be unlawful”), 842(b) (providing that “[n]o public utility shall, with respect to any . . . sale
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or advantage
to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage”), 842d(e)
(authorizing FERC to conduct “a hearing concerning the lawfulness of” any rate or charge), 824e(a)
(requiring FERC, when it determines that a rate or change “is unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory or preferential . . . [to] determine the just and reasonable rate” or charge), 824o
(providing FERC with authority to enforce “reliability standards” via “Electric Reliability
Organizations” certified by FERC).
10
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Figure 1: Transmission Interconnections in the Continental U.S.11

For most of the 20th century, FERC regulated wholesale electricity rates exclusively on a cost
of service basis, under which utilities were permitted to recover the prudent expenses they
incurred in providing services, plus a reasonable return on capital. Recently, however, FERC has
increasingly relied on markets to set rates. This shift began in the late 1980s, with FERC issuing a
series of market-based rate authorizations, which exempt utilities and other suppliers from cost of
service regulation, allowing them to sell electricity at market-based rates.

2.1 The Evolution of Wholesale Electricity Markets
Historically, most vertically-integrated utilities produced electricity through self-supply
(i.e., by constructing their own generating units). Utilities also entered into long-term bilateral
contracts to purchase electricity from independently owned generating units. Such bilateral
contracts are still widely used to procure electricity today; procurement also occurs through
wholesale spot markets in some areas.

See Energy & Policy Institute, How to Secure the Grid and Save Ratepayers Money,
https://perma.cc/C3PP-FY77 (last visited Dec. 30, 2016).
11
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The origins of wholesale markets can be traced back to the energy crisis of the 1970s. In
response to the crisis, Congress enacted the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(“PURPA”)12 to incentivize alternative means of electricity generation, among other things. PURPA
led to the construction of hundreds of merchant generating facilities, the owners of which
demanded access to the utility-owned transmission grid, to transport their electricity to retailers
and/or consumers. In response to those demands, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992,
which authorized FERC to order individual utilities to provide transmission services to merchant
generators. After issuing twelve such orders in twelve separate proceeding, FERC determined that
this case-by-case approach was too costly and time consuming to provide an adequate remedy for
undue discrimination. 13 Thus, in 1996, it issued Orders 888 14 and 889 requiring all utilities to
provide “open access” transmission services.15
Orders 888 and 889 aimed to, among other things, enhance merchant generators’ access to
electric utilities’ transmission infrastructure. 16 Utilities were required to unbundle electricity
transmission from sales17 and act as common carriers, providing transmission services to both
affiliated and non-affiliated companies on a non-discriminatory basis. 18 FERC suggested that
utilities could “ensure fair and non-discriminatory access to transmission services” by forming
independent system operators (“ISOs”) to manage the transmission grid.19 Subsequently, in Order
2000, FERC encouraged utilities to place their transmission facilities under the management of an
ISO or Regional Transmission Operator (“RTO”).20
12

Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (Nov. 9, 1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.).

13

For a discussion of this issue, see New York, 535 U.S. 9 (2002).

Order No. 888: Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 75 FERC 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter Order 888].
14

Order No. 889: Open Access Same-Time Information System (formerly Real-Time Information
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 75 FERC 61,078 (Apr. 24, 1996).
15

16

Order 888, supra note 14, at 1.

17

Id. at 57 – 61.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 280.

Order No. 2000: Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC 61,285 (Dec. 20, 1999)
[hereinafter Order 2000].
20
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ISO/RTOs are independent bodies which operate the transmission system in one or more
states. Figure 2 below shows the ISO/RTOs currently operating in the U.S. Six of those ISO/RTOs –
the California IOS (“CAISO”), Midcontinent ISO (“MISO”), New England ISO (“ISO-NE”), NYISO,
PJM Interconnection (“PJM”), and Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”) – are regulated by FERC. FERC
does not have regulatory authority over the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”) as its
transmission system “is located solely within the state of Texas and is not synchronously
interconnected to the rest of the United States.”21

Figure 2: ISO/RTOs Operating in the U.S.

Each ISO/RTO is a non-profit or profit-neutral corporation that contracts with transmission
facility owners (“Transmission Owners”) regarding transmission and wholesale market
governance.22 In addition to those basic contracts, each ISO/RTO also adopts two tariffs, subject to
FERC, ERCOT, RTO/ISO, https://perma.cc/UE82-FFE3 (last updated Nov. 17, 2015). ERCOT’s
operations are overseen by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the state legislature. See
FERC, Texas (ERCOT), ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS, https://perma.cc/GB6D-6SGV (last updated Mar.
10, 2016).
21

Amended and Restated Transmission Control Agreement among the California Independent
Service Operator Corporation and Transmission Owners (Mar. 31, 1998), https://perma.cc/JRQ622
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FERC review (ERCOT’s excepted), that specify how the ISO/RTO is to oversee regional
transmission facilities and markets; the Open Access Transmission Tariff (“OATT”) governs to the
former, the Market Services Tariff (“MST”) the latter.

2.2 Wholesale Electricity Market Operation
Each ISO/RTO operates two wholesale electricity or “energy” markets, namely:
1. a day-ahead market, in which participants commit to buy or sell electricity at various times
over the next twenty four hours, based on forecast demand (“load”); and
2. a real-time market, in which participants buy and sell electricity to balance differences between
the day ahead commitments and actual load and generation.23
Wholesale energy markets are open to any entity that, after securing the necessary approvals, can
generate electricity and deliver it to the grid. The principal suppliers in most markets are utilities
with excess generating capacity, utility-affiliated competitive generators, and independent power
producers. 24 The principal buyers in most markets are LSEs, which provide retail electricity
services to residential, commercial, and industrial customers. LSEs participating in wholesale
energy markets currently serve consumers accounting for two-thirds of national electricity load.25
While the specific design of energy markets varies between ISO/RTOs, all use bid-based
auctions to set prices. During the auction, generators submit bids indicating the price at which they
are willing to supply electricity, based on their marginal costs.26 Generators are dispatched based

2EJ5; ISO New England, Transmission Operating Agreements, https://perma.cc/UVB4-HWFL, (last
visited Dec. 11, 2016)) (providing links to Transmission Operating Agreement, Rate Design and
Funds Disbursement Agreement, Phase I/II Transmission Operating Agreement, Phase I/II HVDC
transmission facility); Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, LLC
(July 14, 2011), https://perma.cc/KX2K-2T8Y.
FERC, SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH: DEFINITION, PRACTICES, ISSUES, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 5-6 (2006), https://perma.cc/8HW6-KKHC.
23

Another category of suppliers is demand response aggregators, being entities that enlist endusers to participate in demand response programs, whereby they agreed to curtail their electricity
use at certain times, and sell the combined load reduction in wholesale energy markets.
24

FERC, Electricity Markets: National Overview, https://perma.cc/2X7R-S2RH (last updated Feb. 29,
2016).
25

Generators’ bids typically reflect their variable costs of operation, including operations and
maintenance costs, fuel costs, and emissions costs (e.g., the cost of acquiring emissions permits) (if
26
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on their bids, from lowest to highest, until load is satisfied.27 The bid of the last supplier dispatched
(the “marginal generator”) determines the market-clearing price which is paid to all suppliers
regardless of their bids (see Example 1).

Several ISO/RTOs also administer auctions for procuring capacity. In Order 2000, FERC
determined that ISO/RTOs should be responsible for maintaining electric system reliability and
must, among other things, ensure sufficient generating capacity is available to satisfy load.28 To
that end, ISO/RTOs may operate capacity markets in which owners of generating facilities are paid
to have reserves29 available in case they are needed in the future.30 Capacity markets operate in a

any). SUSAN F. TIERNEY & PAUL J. HIBBARD, ANALYSIS GROUP, CARBON CONTROL AND COMPETITIVE
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS: COMPLIANCE PATHS FOR EFFICIENT MARKET OUTCOMES 35
(2015), https://perma.cc/F2Q7-WUFK.
An ISO / RTO may elect not to dispatch generators on the basis of cost if doing so would threaten
the security of the electricity system. Thus, for example, an ISO / RTO may choose not to dispatch
the least-cost generator if doing so would result in transmission congestion or other operational
problems. This approach is known as “security constrained least-cost” dispatch. For a discussion of
security constrained least cost dispatch, see FERC, supra note 23.
27

28

Order 2000, supra note 20, at 315.

The term “reserves” refers to generating capacity that is a currently unused but which is
available to serve load. See generally Zhi Zhou et al., Argonne National Laboratory, Survey of U.S.
Ancillary Services Markets (Jan. 2016), https://perma.cc/HQ8N-4NBM (indicating that “reserves
are typically segmented into two categories, 1) Spinning or Synchronized Reserves that are
29
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similar way to energy markets, with participants submitting bids that reflect the price at which
they are willing to buy and sell capacity. The bids are then matched by the ISO/RTO to determine a
clearing price, which is typically expressed per unit of capacity and paid to suppliers on a monthly
basis. Whereas capacity prices are recovered through fixed monthly payments, electricity prices
fluctuate hourly.
If there were no logistical impediments to the flow of electricity, a single price would apply
throughout an ISO/RTO region for a given interval.31 However, because transmission congestion
and/or other operational problems regularly impede electricity flows, some areas must rely on
electricity priced above the region’s lowest price. 32 To account for differences in the cost of
electricity used in different areas, ISO/RTOs price electricity using the locational marginal price
(“LMP”) at each of various nodes (i.e., locations) on the transmission system.33

3. ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN NEW YORK
Electricity transmission and wholesale electricity sales in New York are managed by
NYISO. In December 1999, NYISO took over management of the New York Control Area
provided by generation units that are actively generating and have the ability to increase or
decrease their output, 2) Non-spinning or Non-synchronized Reserves that are provided by
generation resources that are not actively generating, but are able to start up and provide
generation within a specified timeframe. Operating reserves typically have response times on the
order of ten to 30 minutes and can similarly be provided by supply-side resources that are capable
of reducing their load.”)
Alternatively, an ISO / RTO may impose a “resource adequacy” obligations on load-serving
entities, requiring them to self-supply capacity, either through construction of new capacity
resources or by entering into bilateral arrangements to purchase capacity. See SUSAN F. TIERNEY &
PAUL J. HIBBARD, ANALYSIS GROUP, CARBON CONTROL AND COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY
MARKETS: COMPLIANCE PATHS FOR EFFICIENT MARKET OUTCOMES 36 (2015), https://perma.cc/L46MMLF7.
30

31

PJM INTERCONNECTION, LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/T9VQ-KD4K.

32

Id.

For a discussion of locational marginal pricing, see PJM Interconnection, Locational Marginal
Pricing, BUYING & SELLING ELECTRICITY, https://perma.cc/6BED-UX4C(last visited Nov. 22, 2016);
ISO-NE, Locational Marginal Pricing, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://perma.cc/2FCU-ULAT
(last visited Nov. 22, 2016); NYISO, LOCATIONAL BASED MARGINAL PRICING: THE CORNERSTONE OF
THE NYISO MARKET OPERATION, https://perma.cc/FXR3-VJWL.
33
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(“NYCA”), which is coterminous with New York’s borders. NYISO divides the NYCA into 11
Zones (see Figure 3 below). Of those, the five “downstate” Zones (Long Island, New York City,
Dunwoodie, Millwood, and the Lower Hudson Valley) account for about fifty-eight percent of the
state’s load and sixty-five percent of its peak load, but generate only forty percent of its
electricity.34 This mismatch has made congestion between downstate and upstate zones35 —and
downstate transmission adequacy more generally—a high-priority issue.36 The addition of over
2,700 MW of transmission capacity since 2000 has not resolved the issue, not least because peak
load continues to grow even as NYISO-wide load has flattened out.37
Figure 3: NYISO Zones A through K

NYISO, POWER TRENDS: THE CHANGING ENERGY LANDSCAPE 2016, at 2 (2016),
https://perma.cc/W3QB-9DZH [hereinafter POWER TRENDS].
34

B. Howard et al., Current and near-term GHG emissions factors from electricity production for New
York State and New York City, 187 APPLIED ENERGY 255 (Feb. 2017), https://perma.cc/FY5L-KXSW.
35

See David B. Patton et al., 2015 State of the Market Report for the New York ISO Markets 10 (May
2016), http://bit.ly/2gzintb (charting levels of inter-zone congestion and noting that the value of
congestion--meaning costs resulting from it--were $539 and $700 for the day-ahead and real-time
energy markets respectively).
36

37

POWER TRENDS, supra note 34, at 9–10 fig.6.
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The generation mix in NYISO has changed substantially over the last decade.38 Since 2000,
coal and oil have declined, natural gas and renewables have made up the difference, and nuclear
and hydro have held steady (see Figure 4). 39 These changes have contributed to substantial
reductions in regional emissions: annual sulfur dioxide emissions have dropped ninety-four
percent and carbon dioxide emissions forty-two percent.40
Figure 4: NYISO Generation Mix 2000 - 2016

3.1

NYISO Markets for Energy, Capacity, and Ancillary Services
Like other ISO/RTOs, NYISO manages markets that allocate energy, ancillary services, and

capacity. The energy and ancillary services markets establish prices reflective of the value of
energy at each locational node on the NYISO transmission network. The capacity markets establish

38

NYISO, 2016 LOAD & CAPACITY DATA ("GOLD BOOK") (Apr. 2016), https://perma.cc/W45L-JLDR.

39

POWER TRENDS, supra note 34, at 26 fig.20.

40

Id. at 35–36.
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prices reflective of expectations for how much existing and new capacity will be required to meet
demand generally and at peak times.
NYISO’s markets for energy assign location-specific prices in five-minute increments based
on day-ahead and real-time auctions, as well as bilateral contracts between wholesalers and
retailers. The day-ahead market schedules about ninety-four percent of the energy that is delivered
in NYISO; the real-time market schedules the remainder and thereby serves as a corrective for dayahead arrangements that over- or under-estimate load.41 Auctions account for about sixty percent
of NYISO’s energy transactions; bilateral contracts account for the remaining forty percent.42
NYISO’s ancillary services markets assign prices to a group of operations that underpin
reliability by filling in gaps left by the energy markets. NYISO provides some of those operations,
some are provided by transmission customers and suppliers, and others are self-provided by
NYISO market participants. 43 These operations, which draw on both physical equipment and
human resources, include:


voltage support, meaning maintenance of a voltage level that falls within both power quality
requirements and transmission facilities’ heat tolerances;44



regulation and frequency response, which involves minute-to-minute adjustments that balance
out unexpected small changes in generation and load;45



energy imbalance, which is the term of art for allocations and settlements arrived at through
the real-time market that correct for over- or under-estimates by day-ahead market participants
and managers;46



operating reserves, which stand ready to provide backup electricity or demand response for
ten- and thirty-minute intervals in case of a sudden large change in generation or load at a
given nodal location;47 and

41

Patton et al., supra note 36, at 36.

42

Id.

43

NYISO, Ancillary Services Manual (Oct. 2016), https://perma.cc/ENW4-ED26.

44

Id. at 3-1.

45

Id. at 4-1.

46

Id. at 5-1.
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black start capability, which is the ability of a generating unit to, after shut down due to a
general blackout and without assistance from the grid, begin operating and delivering power
to the grid.48
Whereas NYISO’s energy and ancillary services markets provide for electricity services in

the short term, its installed capacity market (“ICAP”) trades in options to access transmission,
generation, and demand response resources at a date one to twelve months in the future. 49
NYISO’s ICAP operates through a series of auctions.50 In the Capability Period Auction or “strip
auction,” which occurs twice each year,51 buyers and sellers trade for one or more months of
capacity. Subsequent Monthly Auctions, held at least 15 days before the next calendar month
(called an “Obligation Procurement Period”), allocate capacity for any gaps left by the Capability
Period Auction. Finally, Spot Market Auctions, held at least two days before each Obligation
Procurement Period, resolve any remaining gaps. By assigning auction-derived prices to options to
access particular resources, the ICAP signals when additional resources—whether located within
the NYCA or other balancing areas—are foreseeably necessary to ensure reliability over the
subsequent months.52

47

Id. at 6-1 to 6-2.

48

Id. at 7-1.

Patton et al., supra note 36, at 24; see also Written Statement of Emilie Nelson, VP, NYISO, Docket
No. AD14-18-000, Joint Technical Conference on New York Markets & Infrastructure, at 1–5 (Nov.
3, 2014) (summarizing recent history of ICAP).
49

NYISO, Installed Capacity Manual 5-1 to 5-5 (June 2016), https://perma.cc/L9LH-HAGE. The
parameters for “reliability,” which include reserve margins and other elements, are specified by
the New York State Reliability Council. See generally New York State Reliability Council, Reliability
Rules & Compliance Manual For Planning and Operating the New York State Power System;
Version 38 (Sept. 2016), https://perma.cc/8YVT-5MSG.
50

Auctions must be held at least thirty days before each capability period. The summer capability
period runs from May through October, while the winter period runs from November through
April.
51

NYISO, supra note 50, at 2-1 to 2-2. The parameters for “reliability,” which include reserve
margins and other elements, are specified by the New York State Reliability Council. See generally
New York State Reliability Council, supra note 50.
52
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3.2

NYISO’s approach to planning and tariff revision
Although NYISO’s geographic boundaries align with those of New York, NYISO’s physical

integration in the Eastern Interconnection means that it trades energy and services in interstate
commerce, making it subject to FERC’s authority pursuant to the FPA.53 As noted in Part 2 above,
under the FPA, FERC is authorized to regulate interstate electricity transmission and wholesale
sales.54 FERC’s regulatory authority extends to “any person who owns or operates facilities” used
in those activities (defined as a “public utility”).55 As the operator of New York’s transmission
facilities, NYISO is a public utility for the purposes of the FPA.
NYISO codifies nearly all of its decision-making protocols in the OATT and MST it files
with FERC. These tariffs provide comprehensive prescriptions for parameters to be achieved,
parties to involve, procedures to follow, and valid bases for issuing directions and allocating
resources.56 This subsection summarizes key features of planning and tariff amendment in NYISO,
both of which give prominent roles to stakeholders.57

FPA § 201(b). Disputes still sometimes arise over previously unexplored instances of
jurisdictional line-drawing between NYISO and state entities like the New York PSC. See, e.g.,
Competitive Transmission Developers v. New York Independent System Operator, Inc., 156 FERC ¶
61,164, at P 5 (Sept. 8, 2016) ("CTD contends that NYISO improperly surrenders its responsibilities
to the New York Commission"); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 151 FERC ¶ 61,075, at P 1 (2015)
(Apr. 30 Order), reh'g denied, 153 FERC ¶ 61,010, at P 3 (Oct. 2 2015) (resolving that NYISO rather
than the PSC had jurisdiction to “establish[] compensation for a generator’s return to service to
resolve a reliability need”).
53

54

16 U.S.C. § 842(b).

55

Id. § 842(e).

The November 2016 combined version of these tariffs weighed in at almost 2,800 pages. See New
York Independent System Operator, Inc., NYISO Tariffs (Nov. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/4W5KWQK2.
56

References to “stakeholders” in NYISO tariffs and manuals indicate merchant transmission
developers, generation plant owners, generation developers, demand response providers, and
other participants. NYISO, Reliability Planning Process Manual 2-2 (Apr. 2016).
57
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3.2.1 Planning
NYISO’s Comprehensive System Planning Process updates an operational model of
facilities in NYISO and yields plans for maintaining reliability over the coming ten-year period.58 It
consists of the following four subsidiary processes:
1. Local Transmission Planning Process (“LTPP”);
2. Reliability Planning Process (“RPP”);
3. Congestion Assessment and Resource Integration Study (“CARIS”); and
4. Public Policy Transmission Planning Process (“PPTPP”).
NYISO coordinates the timing of these subsidiary processes so that the LTPP is followed by the
RPP, which is followed by the CARIS; the PPTPP begins midway through LTPP.
The LTPP gathers NYISO Transmission Owners’ studies of their respective areas (“Local
Transmission Plans” or “LTPs”) for review by stakeholders and NYISO’s Electric System Planning
Working Group and Transmission Planning Advisory Subcommittee.59 LTPs can be thought of as
schematic maps of existing and planned transmission facilities, complete with descriptions of those
facilities’ operational features.60
The biennial RPP builds on the LTPs drafted by each of NYISO’s eight Transmission
Owners.61 The RPP consists of the development, review by stakeholders, and approval by NYISO’s
Board of Directors of two studies. The first, known as the Reliability Needs Assessment (“RNA”),
memorializes NYISO staff’s assessment of whether existing and planned Bulk Power Transmission
Facilities are expected to meet Reliability Criteria for resource adequacy, security, and stability

See NYISO, OATT, Attachment Y, § 31 (0.0.0) (codifying approach to Comprehensive System
Planning Process).
58

See NYISO, Markets & Operations: Local Transmission Owner Planning Process,
https://perma.cc/5T6Z-9GUA (last visited Dec. 5, 2016) (“Customers, Market Participants and other
interested parties may review and comment on the planning criteria and assumptions used by
each Transmission Owner, as well as other data and models used by each Transmission Owner in
its LTPP.”)
59

See, e.g., Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), Local Transmission Owner Plan (LTP),
Presentation to NYISO Interested Parties (Oct. 24, 2013), https://perma.cc/824X-S67U.
60

61

NYISO, 2016 Reliability Needs Assessment (Oct. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/7JGP-6VUS.
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over a ten-year time horizon.62 The RNA identifies Reliability Needs—i.e., deficiencies vis-à-vis
Reliability Criteria that signal where transmission and other projects might be necessary—and
specifies a Responsible Transmission Owner for each need. Once NYISO’s Board of Directors
approves the RNA, NYISO requests proposals to address each identified Reliability Need63 and, at
the same time, seeks a “regulated backstop solution” from the Responsible Transmission Owner.64
For the purpose of the RPP, a backstop solution serves both as a benchmark against which to
assess market-based solutions’ viability and—of course—as a backstop in case no satisfactory
market-based solution materializes.
The second report prepared as part of the RPP, known as the Comprehensive Reliability
Plan (“CRP”), lists all viable solutions proposed to address Reliability Needs and also contains
NYISO’s evaluation of those solutions. NYISO selects from among viable solutions based on their
relative cost-effectiveness.
Completion of the CRP prompts the start of the third subsidiary planning process: CARIS.
Like the RPP, CARIS identifies possible needs, seeks proposed solutions, and then evaluates and
selects from among those solutions. The chief difference is that congestion, unlike Reliability
Needs, is chiefly an issue of cost-effectiveness rather than system stability, security, or reliability.
Thus both the identification and evaluation phases of CARIS involve cost-benefit analyses that can
result in a decision to simply tolerate—rather than addressing—a given instance of congestion.65
The PPTPP addresses “public policy requirements,” which NYISO defines as a “federal or
New York State statute or regulation, including a New York Public Service Commission
(“NYPSC”) order adopting a rule or regulation . . . , or any duly enacted law or regulation passed
by a local governmental entity in New York State, that may relate to transmission planning on the
62

See Id. at 26–41.

Proposals can include all resource types: transmission, generation, demand response, or nontransmission alternatives.
63

Whereas market-based solutions receive compensation through NYISO-administered markets or
bilateral agreements, backstop solutions receive compensation directly from NYISO pursuant to
provisions of NYISO’s tariff.
64

This is why NYISO categorizes the CARIS as part of its economic planning process rather than
the RPP or public policy-oriented process. See NYISO, Public Policy Transmission Planning
Manual 1-2 to 1-3 (July 2015), https://perma.cc/ACT6-VVP3.
65
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[Bulk Power Transmission Facilities].”66 The PPTPP was developed to identify transmission needs
rooted in public policy in compliance with FERC’s Order 1000, and it looks to the NYPSC to help
identify and specify public policy requirements.67 The subjects of public policy requirements in
New York include reducing congestion (on its own or as a means of reducing electricity rates) and
reducing the carbon intensity of generation in the NYCA, among others.
NYISO initiates the PPTPP upon the release of a draft version of the RNA, at which point
the PPTPP follows the same basic steps as the RPP and CARIS: identify needs, seek viable
solutions, evaluate solutions (in the PPTPP context, make a Viability and Sufficiency Assessment),
and select from among solutions based on efficiency and cost-effectiveness. A recent example of
the PPTPP at work relates to plans to “unbottle” the transmission linkage connecting western New
York to the hydroelectric generation and pumped storage facilities located near Niagara Falls.68
The NYPSC designated that unbottling as a Public Policy Transmission Need after concluding that
it would result in “significant environmental, economic, and reliability benefits.” 69 Whatever
project or projects address a transmission need will qualify as a Public Policy Transmission Project,
eligible to recover costs under NYISO’s OATT. In its comments in an ongoing NYPSC proceeding
dealing with transmission needs, NYISO observed that “All of the Submittals point to the [New
York Clean Energy Standard], which requires 50% of the state’s electric energy to come from
renewable resources by 2030 (“50% by 30”), as a primary driver of the need for new transmission
facilities in New York.”70 Thus, it appears that many if not all transmission proposals currently
before NYISO could qualify as a Public Policy Transmission Project.

66

NYISO OATT, Attachment Y § 31.1.1.

In the Matter of NYISO, Inc.’s Proposed Public Policy Transmission Needs for Consideration,
Case 14-E-0454, at 2–3 (N.Y.P.S.C. Oct. 13, 2016) (Order Addressing Public Policy Transmission
Need for Western New York) (describing origin and purpose of PPTPP).
67

Id. at 5–7 (describing need); NYISO, Western New York Public Policy Transmission Need Project
Solicitation, (Nov. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/ULS5-HCTJ (requesting Solicitations to address need).
68

69

Oct. 13, 2016 Order, Case 14-E-0454 at 4–5.

In the Matter of New York Independent System Operator, Inc.'s Proposed Public Policy
Transmission Needs for Consideration for 2016, Case No. 16-E-0558, at 7 (N.Y.P.S.C. Dec. 5, 2016),
https://perma.cc/GA4F-XZEF.
70
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3.2.2 Tariff Revisions and Stakeholder Involvement
NYISO uses a multi-committee review process to make decisions, including about whether
to propose a tariff revision for FERC’s approval. NYISO’s basic contract provides for three
committees: Management, Operations, and Business Issues. Each of them is further governed by
By-Laws.71 Formally, NYISO may propose revisions to its MST or OATT to FERC if majorities of
the 10-member NYISO Board of Directors and the Management Committee concur. 72 But this
formal step is just the last in a more elaborate process, sometimes called the “shared governance
process” or “stakeholder review process.” Figure 5 depicts the structure of committees and
subsidiary subcommittees and working groups whose members review, mark up, and revise
proposals before the Management, Operations, or Business Issues Committee finalizes them for
consideration by the Board.73

NYISO, By-Laws of the Management Committee (Jan. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/5CNB-NXWS;
NYISO, By-Laws of the Operating Committee (Feb. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/59CZ-H9J6; NYISO,
By-Laws of the Business Issues Committee (Feb. 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/CP59-5Y9Z.
71

NYISO Agreements art. 19 (Mar. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/4NN2-6MAM; By-Laws of the NYISO,
Inc. art. II § 6(b) (Jan. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/WFR8-U7WL.
72

For a short description of what each component contributes to the whole, see NYISO, Committee
Structure: Scope of Responsibilities 2–5 (2014), https://perma.cc/WE8Q-DUZY.
73
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Figure 5: NYISO Committee Structure

Percolation up through this committee structure ensures that committee members receive
notice and an opportunity to be heard on matters relevant to their client or constituents. NYISO’s
basic contract allocates votes on the Management Committee among generators, other suppliers,
transmission owners, end-use consumers, and public power and environmental groups;74 the other
committees follow the same rubric.75

3.3

FERC Oversight of NYISO
The FPA requires public utilities to notify FERC before making changes to rates or “rules

and regulations affecting or pertaining to” rates.76 Such notice must be given by filing, with FERC,
new rate schedules showing the change(s) to be made to the schedules in force. 77 The new
schedules will take effect after sixty days unless FERC, on its own initiative or following a
74

Agreement § 7.06.

75

Operating Committee By-Laws § 12.01; Business Issues Committee By-Laws § 12.01.

16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (stating that “no change shall be made by any public utility in any . . . rate,
charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after
sixty days’ notice to the Commission”).
76

77

FERC may allow changes to take effect without requiring sixty days notice. Id.
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complaint, commences a review thereof. 78 Where a review is undertaken, FERC may suspend
operation of the schedules for up to five months, while it assesses their lawfulness.79 Based on that
assessment, FERC may accept or reject the schedule, in whole or in part.80
FERC’s review is intended to ensure that the rates and practices set out in the schedule are
just and reasonable81 and not unduly preferential or discriminatory.82 These terms are not defined
in the FPA or other legislation. Guidance on their meaning has, however, been provided in
numerous administrative and court decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
just and reasonable standard is “incapable of precise judicial definition.” 83 FERC is, therefore,
“afford[ed] great deference . . . in its rate decisions.”84 FERC is not required to set rates at any
particular level 85 or using any particular methodology. 86 The only requirement is that the
methodology used appropriately balance the interests of suppliers and customers,87 such that rates
fall “within a zone of reasonableness, where [they] are neither less than compensatory nor
excessive.”88 Rates must be high enough to enable suppliers to recover their costs and earn a return

78

Id. § 824d(e).

Id. at § 824d(3). The schedules will go into effect after five months, regardless of whether FERC
has completed its review.
79

80

Id. § 824e(a).

Id. § 824d(a) (requiring that “all rates . . . made, demanded, or received by any public utility for
or in connection with the transmission or sale of electricity energy . . . and all rules and regulations
affecting or pertaining to such rates . . . be just and reasonable”).
81

Id. § 824d(b) (providing that public utilities must not “(1) make or grant any undue preference or
advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2)
maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect”).
82

83

Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008).

84

Id.

85

Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968).

86

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).

87

Id.

88

Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 734 F.2d 1486, 1502 (D.C. Circuit)
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on investment,89 but not so high as to result in customer exploitation, abuse, or gouging or unjust
discrimination between customer groups.90
The same just and reasonable standard applies to both cost- and market-based rates. With
respect to the latter, FERC has taken the view that rates set in competitive markets will fall within
the “zone of reasonableness,” provided no participant can exercise market power.91 This approach
has been upheld by the courts. In Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit observed that “[i]n a
competitive market, where neither buyer nor seller has significant market power, it is rational to
assume that the terms of their voluntary exchange are reasonable.”92 In this context, market power
has been defined as the ability of a seller to “significantly influence price in the market by
withholding service and excluding competitors for a significant period of time.” 93 Prior to
approving a market-based tariff, FERC requires the seller to demonstrate that it lacks or has
adequately mitigated market power, and is unable to erect barriers to entry.94 FERC monitors
sellers’ activities in the market to ensure that they do not re-attain market power.95
FERC has also taken steps to enhance the functioning of markets and improve their
competitiveness. For example, beginning in 2008, FERC adopted several orders aimed at removing
barriers to the participation of demand-side resources in markets.96 More recently, in 2014, FERC
initiated a broad-ranging review of market design and operational practices that may impair

89

Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603.

90

Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 734 F.2d at 1502.

Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by
Public Utilities 119 FERC ¶ 61,295.
91

92

Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

This definition was adopted in FERC’s first market based rate authorization. See Citizens Power
& Light Corp., 48 FERC ¶ 61,777 (1989).
93

Order No. 697, Market-Based Rates For Wholesale Sales Of Electric Energy, Capacity And
Ancillary Services By Public Utilities 119 FERC ¶ 61,295 (Jun. 21, 2007).
94

95

Id.

Order No. 719, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets 125 FERC ¶
61,071 (Oct. 17, 2008); Order No. 745, Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale
Energy Markets 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 156, 2011) [hereinafter Order No. 745].
96
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competition.97 Based on the findings of that review, FERC has required various design changes,
aimed at improving how markets run. 98 Thus, as the Supreme Court has observed, FERC
“ensure[s] ‘just and reasonable’ wholesale [electricity] rates by enhancing competition – attempting
. . . to break down regulatory and economic barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale.”99

4. PRICING CARBON IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
There is growing interest among ISO/RTOs in incorporating carbon pricing into wholesale
energy and/or capacity markets. In August 2016, NYISO launched the Integrating Public Policy
Project (“IPPP”) to assess whether introduction of a carbon price “would improve the overall
efficiency of . . . energy and capacity markets,” among other things.100 Proposals for how to better
respond to state and federal policies aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions from electricity
generation have also been considered by CAISO, ISO-NE, and PJM.

4.1

Electricity Generation and Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Electricity generation is a leading source of carbon dioxide emissions in the U.S. According

to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), electricity generation emitted over two
billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2014, equivalent to 36.7 percent of national carbon dioxide
emissions.101 The level of emissions from a particular generating unit varies depending on the fuel
used and its carbon-intensity.102 Coal is the most carbon-intensive generating fuel, followed by oil
(which contains twenty-five percent less carbon than coal per unit of energy) and gas (which

FERC, NOTICE: PRICE FORMATION IN ENERGY AND ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKETS DOCKET
OPERATED BY REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS AND INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATORS
(2014), https://perma.cc/W2ZL-BZEB.
97

See e.g., Order No. 825, Settlement Intervals and Shortage Pricing in Markets Operated by
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators 155 FERC ¶ 61,276 (Jun.
16, 2016) [hereinafter Order No. 825].
98

Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 536.
MIKE DESOCIO, NYISO, 2017 INTEGRATING PUBLIC POLICY: DETAILED SCOPE 3 (2016),
https://perma.cc/MQ3P-LYTD.
99

100

EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990 – 2014 ES-5 (2016),
https://perma.cc/7DWK-9GN6.
101

102

Id. at 3-6.
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contains forty-five percent less carbon than coal).103 Other generating fuels, such as nuclear and
renewables, contain little or no carbon.
When coal and other fossil fuels are combusted during electricity generation, the carbon
stored in the fuel is oxidized, producing carbon dioxide and small amounts of other gases.104 The
Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) estimates that coal-fired generating units emit, on
average, 2.1 pounds of carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour (“KWh”) of electricity generated. 105
Carbon dioxide emissions from oil and gas-fired units average 1.7106 and 1.2107 pounds per KWh of
electricity generated respectively.
Carbon dioxide traps heat in the earth’s atmosphere, causing surface temperatures to rise.
According to the 2014 National Climate Assessment, average annual temperatures in the U.S. have
risen by 1 to 2oF since 1895, and may rise a further 2 to 4oF “over the next few decades.”108
Temperatures have risen far faster in Alaska—since 1949 average annual temperatures have risen
by 3.3oF and average winter temperatures by 6.1oF.109 Rising temperatures lead to more variable
precipitation patterns and increase the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Impacts
expected in the New York region include more frequent and intense heat waves, more intense
precipitation events, and storm surges incident to sea level rise and more powerful coastal
103

Id.

Id. at 3-8. The other gases emitted include carbon monoxide, methane, and non-methane volatile
organic compounds. These gases are, for the most part, eventually oxidized to carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere.
104

EIA, How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced per Kilowatt hour when Generating Electricity with Fossil
Fuels? FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://perma.cc/VHF4-8EDV (last visited Nov. 23, 2016)
(estimating emissions from generating units using bituminous coal, subbituminous coal, and
lignite coal at 2.07, 2.16, and 2.17 pounds per kilowatt hour (“KWh”) respectively).
105

Id. (estimating emissions from generating units using distillate oil (no. 2) and residual oil (no. 6)
at 1.647 and 1.76 pounds per KWh respectively).
106

107

Id. (estimating emissions from generating units using natural gas at 1.22 pounds per KWh).

U.S. Global Change Research Program, Chapter 1: Overview and Report Findings, in CLIMATE
CHANGE $84IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT 8 (Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014),
https://perma.cc/6S2L-66DV.
108

University of Alaska-Fairbanks, The Alaska Climate Research Center, Temperature Changes in
Alaska, https://perma.cc/M6T7-XND2 (last visited Dec. 6, 2016).
109
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storms.110 These impacts are already being felt in many areas and “have affected and will continue
to affect human health, water supply, agriculture, transportation, energy . . . and many other
sectors of society” over coming decades.111

4.2

Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Electricity Generation
Recognizing that climate change endangers public health and welfare, in December 2009, the

EPA listed carbon dioxide as an air pollutant under the Clean Air Act.112 EPA regulations adopted
in August 2015 and known as the Clean Power Plan aim to reduce emissions from existing electric
generating units by thirty-two percent below 2005 levels by 2025. 113 The regulations establish
emissions limits for each state’s electricity sector, but do not specify how those limits are to be
achieved. This is left to the discretion of the states, which have wide latitude in deciding how to
comply. A number of states were considering carbon pricing as a means of complying with the
Clean Power Plan.114 Notably however, many states suspended their compliance work following
the February 2016 Supreme Court decision to stay implementation of the Clean Power Plan
pending resolution of legal challenges thereto.115 Even if the Clean Power Plan is upheld by the
courts, it is unlikely to be implemented having been strongly opposed by President Trump during
his campaign.116

New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report Executive Summary, 1336 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI.
9, 9–11 (Jan. 2015).
110

111

Id. at 9.

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (40 CFR Ch. 1).
112

Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (40 CFR Pt. 60). On February 9, 2016, the
Supreme Court stayed implementation of the regulations, pending judicial review. See West
Virginia v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
113

See, e.g., MELINDA E. TAYLOR & ROMANY M. WEBB, EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN: IMPLEMENTATION
OPTIONS 15 (2015), https://perma.cc/36NT-54PV.
114

E&E News, Supreme Court Stay Response, E&E’S POWER PLAN HUB, https://perma.cc/3RW5VDGX (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
115

Annie Sneed, Trump’s First 100 Days: Climate and Energy, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 29, 2016,
https://perma.cc/RKF8-D7U7.
116
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4.3

Why Put a Price on Carbon Dioxide Emissions?
The costs associated with carbon dioxide emissions are generally not reflected in electricity

market prices.117 Those costs take the form of “externalities” – impacts that are felt by third parties
or the public at large—but have no price attributed to them by market participants.118 This results
in a market failure, whereby prices are lower than costs, leading to higher levels of production and
consumption than are socially optimal.119 Government intervention is, therefore, needed to ensure
that social costs are fully taken into account in production and consumption decisions.120 Such
intervention could take a number of forms, including command-and-control regulations that limit
the use of fossil fuels in electricity generation or market-based instruments, such as carbon pricing.
A carbon price internalizes the external costs of carbon dioxide emissions from electricity
generation and thus increases the cost of generation using fossil fuels, leading to lower demand
from consumers and encouraging generators to switch to cleaner alternatives. Generators will
make the switch and/or take other steps to reduce emissions wherever the costs of doing so are less
than the carbon price. In this way, carbon pricing affords generators flexibility to find and exploit
the most cost-effective emissions reductions. It tends to be more efficient than command-andcontrol regulation, which may force generators to pursue higher-cost emissions reductions.
Despite these benefits, to date, Congress has failed to enact legislation establishing a
national carbon pricing scheme. In the absence of federal action, some states have adopted their
own, more limited pricing schemes. One example is California, which has established a cap-and-

For a discussion of this issue, see NOAH KAUFMAN ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE,
PUTTING A PRICE ON CARBON: REDUCING EMISSIONS 6 (2016), https://perma.cc/4NFQ-K3AD.
117

118

Id.

119

Id.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY
PRODUCTION AND USE 3 (2010), https://perma.cc/2AHP-VD5W (stating that, when prices do not
reflect external costs, they “are ‘hidden’ in the sense that government and other decision makers,
such as electric utility managers, may not recognize the full costs of their actions. When market
failures like this occur, there may be a case for government interventions in the form of
regulations, taxes, fees, tradable permits, or other instruments that will motivate such
recognition”).
120
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trade program requiring in-state electricity generators and importers121 emitting 25,000 metric tons
or more of carbon dioxide equivalent per year to purchase allowances, at prices set through
quarterly auctions. 122 Another even more limited example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (“RGGI”), in which New York and eight other north-eastern states participate. As part of
RGGI, fossil fuel generators with at least twenty-five megawatts (“MW”) of capacity in New York
are required to purchase carbon dioxide emissions allowances, through quarterly auctions.123 RGGI
thus assigns a price to approximately eight percent of state-wide emissions from all sectors; it
ignores emissions from smaller electricity generators and electricity imports, as well as direct
emissions from the industrial, transportation, or agricultural sectors.124

4.4

Proposals for Carbon Pricing in ISO/RTOs
Several ISO/RTOs have recently explored mechanisms that would support the direct or

indirect pricing of generation sources’ carbon intensity. The mechanisms and the reasons why they
are being considered are summarized in this part. One notable impetus for this exploration in
NYISO, PJM, CAISO, and ISO-NE has been EPA’s Clean Power Plan. The 2016 election, by putting
the fate of the Clean Power Plan in doubt, has raised questions about the direction each ISO/RTO
will take. While rescission of the Clean Power Plan would remove a key driver for action, it would
not, from a legal perspective, directly affect ISO/RTOs’ authority to adopt a carbon pricing scheme.
(This might change, should the Trump Administration and Congress undo EPA’s 2009
Endangerment Finding and the various regulatory authorities built upon it. 125 ) For many

An electricity importer’s emissions are calculated based on the annual emissions from each of its
sources. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95812(c)(2)(B).
121

122

Id. § 95852(b). See also id. § 95910 et seq.

123

RGGI, Inc., New York: Facility Information, https://perma.cc/BQ7F-KL4S (last visited Dec. 7, 2016)

Lucas Bifera, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2
fig.1 (Dec. 2013), https://perma.cc/E28K-L5D7; see also New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority, New York State Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Forecast: Inventory 19902011 and Forecast 2012-2030; Updated Final Report, at S-2 (June 2015), https://perma.cc/Q76DAQW8.
124

See Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power
Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 305 (2014) (“in today’s dominant regulatory and policy paradigm,
125
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ISO/RTOs, including NYISO, state-level policies (e.g., New York’s CES) will continue to drive
interest in carbon pricing.
4.4.1 New York ISO
NYISO’s IPPP will assess “[w]hether a redesign is needed in the wholesale market” and, in
particular, whether and how to “internalize the cost of carbon” to improve market efficiency.126
The IPPP was launched to “investigate potential market impacts from the implementation of the
[CES]” 127 adopted by the NYPSC in August 2016. 128 As part of the IPPP, NYISO will consider
“[a]lternative market friendly approaches” to achieving the goals of the CES, including carbon
pricing.129
4.4.2 PJM Interconnection
An August 2016 PJM white paper put forward a mechanism for reconciling two competing
priorities in the PJM region:
1. states’ subsidies and price supports for renewable generation, which depress energy market
prices; and
2. timely investments in new generation capacity, which rely on signals sent by market price
rises.130
That mechanism would involve a two-stage auction. In Stage 1, subsidized resources and the
demand they would serve (“related demand”) would both be removed from the auction for the
purpose of determining capacity requirements for the relevant time period. The resources that
clear the auction and the subsidized resources would both take on capacity commitments, all with
identical performance requirements. Compensation for the subsidized resources’ capacity
commitments would be entirely the responsibility of their sponsoring state government; the
the environmental consequences of electricity generation are ‘matters directly related to the
economic aspects’ of such transactions.”) (emphasis added).
126 DESOCIO, supra note 100, at 3.
127

Id. at 2.

Press Release, New York State, Governor Cuomo Announces Establishment of Clean Energy
Standard that Mandates 50 Percent Renewables by 2030 (Aug. 1, 2016) (on file with authors).
128

129

Id.

130

Bresler, supra note 1.
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related demand would not have to pay. In Stage 2, subsidized resources would be included in the
auction, but at a reference price that approximates the unsubsidized cost for that resource type at
the relevant locational node. Any resource that fails to clear in Stage 1 would not be eligible to
receive compensation through the auction, even if it bids into Stage 2 at a price below the second
stage clearing price.
This two-stage process would not assign a price to carbon, but would make it easier for
states located in the PJM balancing area to do so without disrupting the operation of the wholesale
energy or capacity markets.
4.4.3 California ISO
California’s legislature and governor have called for expansion of CAISO to encompass
other western states on the grounds that such expansion will serve several goals, including
lowering costs, improving reliability, and supporting renewable energy development. 131 That
expansion would, however, mean departing from a situation where the California Public Utility
Commission and CAISO largely share a geographic footprint that does not extend beyond
California’s borders. The new expanded CAISO would have to devise and manage a wholesale
marketplace that spans multiple states only one of which assigns a price to GHG emissions. CAISO
devised three possible mechanisms (“Options”) for navigating this circumstance:
1. Compare the actual dispatch of electricity from particular sources that serve load in California
to weeks- or months-long baselines, and thereby attribute estimated GHG emissions to
particular sources based on the differences between actual and baseline dispatch;
2. Conduct quick (at five-minute intervals) two-step analyses that first determine the most costeffective regional dispatch of electricity and then attribute GHG emissions to sources; or

California Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 2015, c. 547 § 13 (amending Pub. Util.
Code § 359.5 (a) to read: “It is the intent of the Legislature to provide for the transformation of the
Independent System Operator into a regional organization . . . , and that the transformation should
only occur where it is in the best interests of California and its ratepayers.”); Letter from G. Brown,
Governor of California, to California legislative leadership regarding CAISO expansion 1 (Aug. 8,
2016), https://perma.cc/68RM-KPDV; see also Brattle Group, Senate Bill 350 Study: The Impacts of a
Regional ISO-Operated Power Market on California, I-xiv (July 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/TVD88NVT (noting that demand for integration of more renewables prompts need to expand).
131
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3. Conduct a two-step analysis similar to Option 2, but rather than mapping dispatch and
attributing emissions with complete specificity (a computationally difficult task), impose either
an averaged emissions factor or a “hurdle rate” on imported generation, making exceptions for
generators party to bilateral contracts with California LSEs.132
Of these, CAISO and the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) are now considering
only Option 3.133 CAISO and CARB raised concerns about Option 1 because CARB’s regulations
would not permit the crediting of emissions reductions involved.134 And CAISO indicated that
performing the quick calculations required for Option 2 would exceed its computational
capacity.135
4.4.4

ISO New England
The New England Power Pool (“NEPOOL”) initiated the Integrating Markets and Public

Policy (“IMAPP”) stakeholder process in August 2016 to explore options for decarbonizing the
electric grid without sacrificing reliability or market-based electricity price formation.136 In addition
to anticipating Clean Power Plan compliance measures, two other factors motivated IMAPP: first,
natural gas has dominated regional capacity additions to such an extent since the late 1990s that
ISO-NE is now susceptible to significant adverse effects should there be a natural gas supply shock
or price jump; and second, wholesale market prices are artificially reduced by the inclusion of
subsidized resources in capacity auctions, which in turn distorts incentives for investment in new

G. Angelidis & D. Tretheway, Regional Integration California Greenhouse Gas Compliance and
EIM Greenhouse Gas Enhancement Straw Proposal 9–10 (Nov. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/8EE68MEU.
132

Don Tretheway, Regional Integration-California Greenhouse Gas Compliance Initiative–Second
Update 42 (Oct. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/4X4F-2YU2.
133

134

Id. at 16.

Id. at 18 (“Current computational power would require simplifying (less accurate) first pass to
ensure [real-time dispatch] successfully completes”).
135

Chairman’s Opening Remarks, NEPOOL IMAPP Initiative (Aug. 11, 2016),
https://perma.cc/3PU4-8X5T (“Our goal is to achieve and maintain our high standards for
reliability that our constituents demand, and to do so using the discipline of competition, while
incorporating the states’ goals of decarbonizing our industry over time.”) (emphasis added). IMAPP
agendas, presentations, and white papers are all posted online. See NEPOOL, Integrating Markets
and Public Policy, https://perma.cc/8BX8-WLY7 (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).
136
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capacity. (All six states within ISO-NE’s territory provide for some form of support for
renewables.137)
Participants put forward fifteen different proposals, which fall into four broad categories as
follows:
1. introduction of a carbon pricing scheme, whereby a carbon adder would be imposed on
generators’ bids, reflecting their carbon intensity;
2. changes to the forward capacity market, such that certain generators would receive payments
for both their capacity and their zero emission attributes;
3. introduction of a two-stage auction, similar to that proposed by PJM, which insulates
wholesale market price formation from state policies; and
4. establishment of a Forward Clean Energy Market, in which LSEs could procure long-term
commitments (up to ten years) for zero-emitting energy (not capacity) resources.

5. NEW YORK’S EXISTING CARBON PRICING POLICIES
New York has introduced not one but two partial carbon prices, first by participating in
RGGI, a cap-and-trade scheme, and more recently with the NYPSC’s adoption of the CES. Both
programs focus on the electricity sector but take different approaches to price formation and
leakage, i.e., out-of-state emissions that are (i) not subject to restrictions or pricing, and (ii) caused
by in-state electricity consumption.138 As described in this part, their approaches to prices and
leakage have important legal implications.

Gordon van Welie, ISO New England, State of the Grid: ISO on Background 30 (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://bit.ly/2g8DpkA (noting that all six states impose RPSs); see also e.g., Mass. H.B. 4568 (2016)
(authorizing state agency to draft and execute PPAs for renewable generation); Conn. Pub. Act No.
15-107 (same).
137

See Jonathan L. Ramseur, Congressional Research Service, The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative: Lessons Learned and Issues for Congress 16 (Apr. 27, 2016), http://bit.ly/2gJtWhd. A
more general definition of leakage is: an “increase in emissions by entities not subject to a
regulation, due to increases in costs for generators subject to the regulation.” Daniel Shawhan,
Emission Reductions and “Leakage” from US State Cap-and-Trade Programs, slide 5 (Sept. 19,
2013), https://perma.cc/PEJ7-F9FL.
138
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5.1

RGGI
RGGI, the older of New York’s two carbon pricing programs, requires New York’s seventy-

six largest in-state fossil fuel-fired generators to purchase carbon dioxide emissions allowances.139
The legal basis for New York’s participation in RGGI is a set of regulations adopted by the state
Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) and Energy Research and Development
Authority (“NYSERDA”). 140 State regulations require covered generators to purchase carbon
dioxide emissions allowances through quarterly auctions. Auctions are conducted using a sealed
bid format in which each generator may submit multiple bids to purchase a specified number of
allowances at different prices.141 Bids are ranked by price, from high to low, and allowances issued
until cumulative demand equals supply. 142 A region-wide declining cap limits the number of
allowances available for purchase.143 The cap was set at 86.5 million allowances in 2016144 and will

139

RGGI, Inc., New York: Facility Information, https://perma.cc/BQ7F-KL4S (last visited Dec. 7, 2016)

6 NYCRR pt. 242 (DEC: CO2 Budget Trading Program; requiring covered facilities to purchase
allowances); 21 NYCRR pt. 507 (NYSERDA: CO2 Allowance Auction Program; authorizing
NYSERDA to coordinate New York facilities’ participation in auctions). Governor Pataki along
with the governors of other RGGI states signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005.
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initative, Memorandum of Understanding (Dec. 20, 2005),
https://perma.cc/G6YQ-443U. That document has no legal force, and merely memorialized the
governors’ commitments to pursue whatever was necessary for their respective states to
participate. See Thrun v. Cuomo, 976 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (App. Div. 3d 2013). The only legal
challenged brought against New York’s participation in RGGI argued that (i) because it is
effectively a tax, legislative approval is required; (ii) the Memorandum of Understanding is an
unconstitutional interstate compact; and (3) the regulations themselves were arbitrary and
capricious and promulgated pursuant to an “error of law.” Thrun at 323. The court rejected all of
these arguments, which were raised well after the four-month statute of limitations had run. Id. at
324.
140

RGGI, INC., FACT SHEET: RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/AKD6V6B8.
141

RGGI, INC., CO2 ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 10 (2016),
https://perma.cc/MP8D-R33N.
142

143

See generally Ramseur, supra note 138.

RGGI, Inc., 2016 Allowance Allocation, PROGRAM DESIGN, https://perma.cc/6HM3-ZUFL(last
visited Dec. 15, 2016).
144
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decline to 76 million allowances by 2020.145 Each allowance permits the holder to emit one ton of
carbon dioxide.
Because RGGI states impose a price on carbon dioxide emissions, in the form of an
allowance cost, and the states around them do not, the program is vulnerable to leakage. Like other
RGGI states, New York’s RGGI-implementing regulations do not currently seek to prevent
leakage. Recent analyses of whether this leakage tolerance has undermined RGGI’s carbon price
conclude that, to date, RGGI’s emissions pricing has increased imports,146 but that access to imports
from relatively cheap natural gas-fired generation in Pennsylvania and Ohio and hydropower in
Quebec have meant a decrease in emissions nonetheless.147 Regardless of whether this fortuitous
circumstance is likely to last, RGGI participants have committed to examining options for
improving the tracking of imports from outside RGGI and potentially adjusting the prices assigned
to those imports to prevent leakage.148

For a discussion of the cap, see ELIZABETH A. STANTON ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, THE
RGGI OPPORTUNITY: RGGI AS THE ELECTRIC SECTOR COMPLIANCE TOOL TO ACHIEVE 2030 STATE
CLIMATE TARGETS 1 – 2 (2016), https://perma.cc/D6T2-7UK7.
145

Harrison Fell & Peter Maniloff, Beneficial Leakage: The Effect of the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative on Aggregate Emissions, Colorado School of Mines Division of Econ. & Bus. Working
Paper 2015-06, at 23–24 (June 2015), https://perma.cc/543W-8V6X (identifying a 2451.95 gigawatthours per month increase in imports into New York from PJM during RGGI's implementation); but
see Andrew G. Kindle et al., An empirical test for inter-state carbon-dioxide emissions leakage
resulting from the regional greenhouse gas initiative (Apr. 2011), https://perma.cc/MD2R-CYBS
(finding no empirical evidence of leakage in Pennsylvania-New York electricity transmission data
from first year of RGGI’s operation).
146

Fell & Maniloff, supra note 144. Fell and Maniloff find that in regions that export electricity to
New York, RGGI’s carbon price seems to have prompted capacity factor increases of ten to eleven
percent by gas-fired generation sources—but no increases by coal-fired sources. These have offset
capacity factor reductions of seven to ten percent by New York-based coal-fired generators. Id. at
17–18. See also RGGI, CO2 Emissions from Electricity Generation and Imports in the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative: 2013 Monitoring Report 6–7, (Aug. 2016), https://perma.cc/8KVDQDGW (reporting net imports from PJM and Quebec).
147

See RGGI, Inc., RGGI 2012 Program Review: Summary of Recommendations to Accompany
Model Rule Amendments 3 (Feb. 2013), https://perma.cc/6DKK-KQYX.
148
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5.2

CES
New York’s CES, adopted by the NYPSC in August 2016, aims by 2030 to reduce state-wide

GHG emissions by forty percent from a 1990 baseline. While this 40 by 30 goal applies economywide, the bulk of emissions reductions are expected to come from the electricity sector, with the
CES requiring half of the state’s electricity to be generated using renewable energy sources. The
CES consists of three “tiers” of requirements for New York LSEs, 149 but is more usefully
understood as a combination of two programs, one oriented to renewables (Tiers 1 and 2), and the
other (Tier 3) to three of the state’s four nuclear power plants. As explained below, neither
program assigns a price directly to carbon, but each assigns a price to “attributes” that include the
non-emission of carbon.
CES Tiers 1 and 2 extend and modify the state’s existing RPS, which required LSEs to
collect a surcharge, payable to NYSERDA, and authorized NYSERDA to acquire “RPS attributes,”
embodied in RECs, from renewable generators.150 This approach kept the REC market separate
from the market for electricity and also allowed NYSERDA to steer investments in utility-scale and
smaller renewable generation developments. Under the new CES Order, LSEs can comply with the
RPS by acquiring RECs from NYSERDA, from renewable generators directly, or by making
“Alternative Compliance Payments” to NYSERDA151 One qualifying REC is “produced” alongside
each MWh of electricity produced by a renewable facility that began commercial operation after
January 1, 2015.152 LSEs must acquire RECs in proportion to the annual load they supply—0.6
percent of load supplied in 2017, 1.1 percent in 2018, up to 4.8 percent in 2021.153
CES Tier 3 requires LSEs to purchase ZECs “produced” by three of the state’s four nuclear
generating stations.154 As with the RECs required to be purchased under Tiers 1 and 2, the Tier 3
149

NYPSC CES Order (Aug. 1, 2016).

For a description of the RPS first adopted in 2004, see New York State Department of Public
Service, 03-E-0188: Renewable Portfolio Standard, https://perma.cc/6YTE-EPMV (updated June 3,
2016).
150

151

CES Order at 14–18, 94, 106–10.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 14.

154

CES Order at 20, 119–52.
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ZECs place a value on a zero-emitting attribute and so are separate from the electric energy sold by
the nuclear generators. However, three key alleged differences have led diverse parties to
challenge Tier 3 on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause (“dCC”) and is preempted by the FPA, namely:155
(1) out-of-state generators cannot actually qualify to sell ZECs, even there is no formal mechanism
preventing them from doing so;
(2) ZEC prices will be set by the NYPSC and limited by wholesale market prices; and
(3) ZECs will soak up ratepayer spending in a way that is likely to suppress wholesale capacity
market prices.156
It appears that the Supreme Court’s recent Armstrong decision, which held that “[t]he Supremacy
Clause . . . does not create a cause of action,”157 may well rescue the CES from challenges arguing
that it is pre-empted by the FPA. Thus Tier 3’s chief legal danger relates to challenges rooted in the
dCC.

6. MECHANISMS OF A NYISO CARBON PRICING SCHEME
Partly in response to adoption of the CES, NYISO launched the IPPP to evaluate options to
“achieve New York’s . . . decarbonisation goals at least cost,” consistent with the operation of
wholesale markets

158

The focus is on “approaches that would internalize the cost of carbon

Complaint, Coalition for Competitive Electricity et al. v. Zibelman, Case 1:16-cv-08164 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2016).
155

See CES Order at 108 (“For the Year 2017 compliance period . . . [t]he REC price offered will
equal the weighted average cost per MWh NYSERDA paid to acquire the RECs to be offered,” i.e.,
they will reflect the cost of developing and operating renewable generation, “plus a reasonable
Commission-approved adder to cover the administrative costs and fees incurred by NYSERDA to
administer Tier 1.”).
156

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015); see also Mont.-Dakota
Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) (holding that FPA does not provide for
any private right of action); cf. Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, Case 16-2946, 2016 WL (2d Cir. DATE
2017) (petitioner brought case via cause of action expressly granted by Congress for claims arising
under Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act but not the FPA more generally).
157

158

DESOCIO, supra note 100, at 5.
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emissions” in markets.159 To that end, NYISO could set a dollar value for each ton of carbon
dioxide emitted during electricity generation (the “carbon price”), which would then be used to
calculate a carbon fee for each generating unit, reflecting its emissions profile. Ideally, this
calculation would be based on the generating unit’s actual emissions160 as follows:
Carbon fee ($ / MWh) = carbon price ($ / ton) x unit emissions (tons / MWh)
A carbon fee would be calculated for all in- and out of-state generators bidding into energy
markets administered by NYISO. While the same carbon price would be applied to all units,
regardless of technology, the resulting carbon fee would vary depending on the fuel used. Coalfired generating units would face the highest carbon fee, followed by oil and then natural gas.
Each generating unit’s carbon fee would be added to its energy market bid to produce a
dispatch cost which would be used by NYISO to determine the dispatch order. The likely effect
would be a re-ordering of dispatch, with coal- and oil-fired generating units dispatched less
frequently and natural gas and renewable generators more frequently, compared to the situation
without a carbon fee (compare examples 1 and 2). The dispatch cost of the marginal generator
would determine the market-clearing price. Generators would receive that price less their carbon
fee.

159

Id.

In the alternative, the calculation could be based on the carbon intensity of the fuel used by the
generating facility, and its heat rate. That is: carbon fee = carbon price x fuel carbon intensity x heat
rate.
160
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6.1

Setting the Carbon Price
Various technical issues will need to be considered in designing a carbon pricing) scheme.

Key among these is the level at which to set the carbon price. As discussed in part 4.3 above,
carbon pricing generally aims to internalize the external costs of carbon dioxide emissions.161 While
the New York public policy triad of RGGI, RECs, and ZECs is based on multiple aims, at the root
of all of them is the reflection in market prices of the cost of GHG emissions, whether directly or in
the form of a non-emitting attribute. To estimate the costs imposed by GHG emissions, the federal
government has developed the social cost of carbon (“SCC”), which reflects:
the economic damages associated with a small increase in carbon dioxide . . .
emissions, conventionally one metric ton, in a given year . . . [It] is meant to
be a comprehensive estimate of the climate change damages and includes,
among other things, changes in agricultural productivity, human health,
property damages from increased flood risk and changes in energy system
costs, such as reduced costs for heating and increased costs for air
conditioning.162

Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, Technical Support Document: Technical
Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866
(May 2013, revised July 2015), https://perma.cc/3NCG-6ZQT.
161

162

EPA, FACT SHEET: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 1 (2015), http://bit.ly/2a9QhmW.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

37

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets

The SCC is calculated by quantifying the current and future damage expected to result
from one metric ton of carbon dioxide.163 That figure is then discounted back to present value to
arrive at the SCC.164 The government has used three different discount rates to calculate three SCCs
shown in Table 1 below.165 Each SCC increases over time as the incremental impact of emissions
rises in line with the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide.166
Table 1: SCC Calculated by the Federal Government167
Year in which carbon
dioxide emissions occur

SCC (2007 $ / metric ton)
5% discount rate

3% discount rate

2.5% discount rate

2015

$11

$36

$56

2020

$12

$42

$62

2025

$14

$46

$68

2030

$16

$50

$73

2035

$18

$55

$78

2040

$21

$60

$84

2045

$23

$64

$89

2050

$26

$69

$95

The SCC was developed to assist federal agencies in performing cost benefit analyses
during rulemaking.168 There is, however, support for its use in other contexts.169 It could be used by

163

Id. at 1.

164

Id.

Id. at 3 (indicating that the “values are based on the average [SCC] from three integrated
assessment models, at discount rates of 5, 3, and 2.5 percent . . . [A] fourth value [was estimated
based on] the 95th percentile of the [SCC] from all three models at a 3 percent discount rate, and is
intended to represent the potential for higher-than-average damages”).
165

Id. at 1 (stating that the SCC “should increase over time because future emissions are expected to
produce larger incremental damages as physical and economic systems become more stressed in
response to greater levels of climate change”).
166

167

Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, supra note 161, at 12.

EPA, supra note 162, at 1; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Hwy. Transp. Safety Bd.,
538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding environmental review and requiring agency to estimate
168
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NYISO to set the carbon price to be incorporated into bids in the wholesale energy market. This
would provide certainty for market participants, as the SCC is a robust metric, developed using
technical models, with input from multiple government departments and the public. Recognizing
this, in the context of ISO-NE’s IMAPP stakeholder process, electric utility Exelon Corporation has
recommended use of the SCC as the touchstone for pricing carbon in energy markets.170
Despite this support, it is worth noting that the SCC is not universally accepted.171 Use of
the SCC to price carbon in wholesale energy markets is likely to be opposed by some industry and
other groups on the basis that it does not merely reflect the costs climate change imposes on
electric grid operations but also includes various other costs (e.g., to the agricultural sector). Those
costs are, however, an externality of electricity generation. As we explain in part 7.1.1 below,
internalizing those external costs is necessary to enhance competition in wholesale electricity
markets and ensure they operate effectively, to produce just and reasonable rates.
The SCC arguably provides the best metric for pricing the external costs of electricity
generation’s carbon dioxide emissions. The lowest SCC, calculated using a five percent discount
rate, is consistent with the carbon prices currently used elsewhere in the electricity sector. For
example:

cost imposed by GHG emissions); Zero Zone Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654 (7th Cir.
2016) (upholding agency’s use of social cost of carbon in cost-benefit analysis).
See, e.g., High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (D.
Colo. 2014) (suggesting that the SCC could be used to estimate the costs of increased carbon
dioxide emissions in environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act). See
also Sarah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 87
TUL. L. REV. 511, 545-546 (noting that the EPA has encouraged federal agencies to use the SCC in
environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act); Michael Burger & Jessica
Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z4K8-TJYV (discussing the possibility
of using the SCC in environmental reviews).
169

Exelon Corporation, Using Carbon Pricing in Dispatch to Meet the IMAPP Process Goals (Aug.
30, 2016), https://perma.cc/6RJQ-Q9K3.
170

For a discussion of opposition to the SCC, see Bruce Lieberman, Social Cost of Carbon: A
Continuing Little-Told Story, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Sep. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/C49E8Z47. See also David Malakoff et al., Trump Team Targets Changes to Key Metric that Calculates
Social Cost of Carbon, Science Insider (Dec. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/PKM5-6BVM.
171
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It is below the implicit carbon price used by the EIA in calculating the levelized cost of
electricity (“LCOE”). The LCOE reflects the per KWh cost of building and operating an electric
generating plant, over an assumed financial life and duty cycle, taking into account capital,
operation, maintenance, and financing costs.172 When calculating the LCOE, the EIA includes a
three percent cost of capital adder for carbon intensive generating units, such as those using
coal.173 The impact of this is, according to the EIA, “similar to that of an emissions fee of $15 per
metric ton of carbon dioxide.”174



It is in line with the carbon price implicit in California’s cap-and-trade program.175 As part of
the cap-and-trade program, California has adopted an allowance auction system, with a
minimum or “reserve” price, which functions as a minimum carbon fee. That fee was $12.73 in
2016176 and will rise $13.57 in 2017.177



It is in line with, and in some cases less than, the carbon prices used internally by electric
utilities. A number of utilities use a carbon price, for example, in their integrated resource
planning processes. These include Xcel Energy Inc. which uses prices in the range of $9 to $34
per ton, Sempra Energy which uses a price of $13 per ton, NiSource Inc. which uses a price of
$20 per ton, and Ameren Corporation which uses prices in the range of $23 to $54 per ton.178

EIA, LEVELIZED COST & LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK (2016), https://perma.cc/CS5S-83MA
172

The EIA asserts that the adder is necessary as “[b]ecause regulators and the investment
community have continued to push energy companies to invest in technologies that are less
greenhouse gas-intensive, there is considerable financial risk associated with major investments in
long-lived power plants with a relatively higher rate of carbon dioxide emissions.” See Id. at 3.
173

EIA, LEVELIZED COST & LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 3 (2014), https://perma.cc/L8SK-CKEQ.
174

175

See supra part 4.4.3.

CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM AND QUÉBEC CAPAND-TRADE SYSTEM: 2016 ANNUAL AUCTION RESERVE PRICE NOTICE (2015), https://perma.cc/NC692SQW.
176

CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM AND QUÉBEC CAP(2016), https://perma.cc/7TG7A57V.
177

AND-TRADE SYSTEM: 2017 ANNUAL AUCTION RESERVE PRICE NOTICE

CDP, PUTTING A PRICE ON RISK: CARBON PRICING IN THE CORPORATE WORLD 62 (2015),
https://perma.cc/KXU4-AHU4.
178
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Given the above, NYISO may elect to use the lowest SCC, calculated using a discount rate
of five percent, so as to mitigate cost impacts. That would result in an initial carbon price of
$12.82.179

6.2

Carbon Price Adjustment
Economists generally agree that carbon prices should rise over time to reflect the fact that,

as more carbon accumulates in the atmosphere, the incremental damage caused by one additional
ton increases.180 Consistent with this view, the SCC rises steadily from $11 in 2015 to $21 in 2040,
and $26 in 2050 (see Table 1 above).
At the time of establishing a carbon pricing scheme, NYISO should adopt procedures,
specifying when and how price adjustments will be made. Ideally, to maximize certainty and
predictability for the private sector, adjustments should be made at pre-defined intervals. NYISO
could, for example, adjust prices every five years in line with the SCC. Assuming NYISO elects to
use the lowest SCC (i.e., calculated using a five percent discount rate), this would result in a
modest increase in carbon prices over the next two decades, mitigating the impact on costs.

6.3

Interaction with Other Carbon Prices

6.3.1

Interaction with RGGI
Some electric generators bidding into NYISO markets are already subject to carbon pricing

through RGGI. It is important that any NYISO carbon pricing scheme avoid requiring generators—
directly or indirectly—to pay twice for the same emissions (i.e., once to comply with the NYISO
MST and once to comply with RGGI). The RGGI price should, therefore, be deducted from
whatever carbon price NYISO adds to covered generators’ bids. The CES, which confronts the
same problem when deriving a ZEC price, solves it by subtracting two values from the SCC. The
first is a fixed projection of the RGGI price, borrowed from NYISO’s CARIS model, which

The 2015 SCC value, calculated using a 5% discount rate, is $11 in 2007. After adjusting for
inflation, that is equivalent to $12.82 in 2016 dollars.
179

See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory
and Experience, 21 J. ENV’T & DEV. 152, 155 (2012).
180

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

41

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets

anticipates patterns of and costs arising from transmission grid congestion.181 The second value is a
hybrid of independent forecasts of NYISO’s energy and capacity markets whose projections
capture anticipated changes to RGGI’s carbon price.182
6.3.2

Interaction with New York’s CES
FERC has determined that it does not have jurisdiction over markets for RECs unbundled

from markets for energy or capacity.183 Thus Tiers 1 and 2 of New York’s CES can operate in
parallel with a wholesale market carbon price without legal consequence. Tier 3, however,
establishes a ZEC price that is both derived from the SCC and constrained by NYISO energy
market prices. Some of the litigants in the current dispute over New York’s CES argue that these
features make the ZEC price potentially subject to FERC’s jurisdiction (see part 5.2 above) as well
as logically duplicative of any carbon price based on the SCC. Consequently, if NYISO’s carbon
price were to derive from the SCC, then NYISO and the NYPSC would have to decide which price
would accommodate or displace the other. Otherwise, both would be premised on correcting
electricity prices to better reflect the value of avoiding the adverse effects of climate change but
would actually impose costs that, in combination, exceed the value they are meant to approximate,
namely a version of the SCC. This logical failing would be legally problematic as well because it
would belie the argument that the carbon pricing scheme improves wholesale price formation by
more accurately incorporating costs that are relevant but were heretofore ignored (see part 7).
Ultimately, either accommodating or displacing Tier 3 of the CES would mean applying a
carbon price more or less uniformly to all the generation sources subject to NYISO’s tariff. The key
differences between the two approaches would relate to implementation. Accommodation would
mean crafting a new mechanism that alters non-nuclear generator bid prices, operates alongside
the CES, and leaves the ZEC prices paid to three nuclear generators undisturbed. Displacement
would mean eliminating Tier 3 and simply modifying the bid prices of all generators based on the

181

CES Order at 131, 135–36.

Those forecasts pertain to Zone A, where no nuclear facilities are located. This lowers ZEC
prices at times when electricity prices are expected to increase.
182

WSPP, Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 P 7 (Apr. 20, 2012) (clarifying that FERC has jurisdiction over
bundled REC and energy transactions, but not over unbundled REC-only transactions).
183
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carbon content of their fuel. Practically, displacement would be far simpler; politically, both are
fraught.

6.4

Likely Effect on Wholesale Electricity Prices
Adoption of a carbon pricing scheme by NYISO will, in the short run, likely lead to an

increase in the market clearing price of electricity. The amount of that increase will depend on the
carbon dioxide emissions profile of the marginal generator since, as described above, prices will be
set equal to that generator’s bid plus a carbon fee based on its emissions. Average emissions from
various classes of generating units are shown in Table 2. Based on those averages and assuming a
carbon price of $12.82,184 the table shows the carbon fee for each class of generator.
Table 2: Estimated Carbon Fee for Fossil Fuel Generators
Generating Resource
Coal – Lignite

Average Emissions Rate185
(per MWh)
1.09 tons

Carbon Fee186
(per MWh)
$13.97

Coal – Subbituminous

1.08 tons

$13.85

Coal – Bituminous

1.04 tons

$13.33

Oil – Residual (No. 6)

0.88 tons

$11.28

Oil – Residual (No. 2)

0.82 tons

$10.51

Natural Gas

0.61 tons

$7.82

Currently, in NYISO markets, natural gas-fired resources are the marginal source of supply
in most intervals.187 It is unclear whether that will remain the case after introduction of a carbon

184

See supra part 6.1.

EIA, How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced per Kilowatt Hour when Generating Electricity with Fossil
Fuels? FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://perma.cc/ZN2K-3AT7 (last updated Feb. 29, 2016)
(estimating the number of pounds of carbon dioxide produced per KWh of electricity generated,
based on the average heat rates for steam electric generators in 2014).
185

186

Calculated assuming a carbon price of $12.82 per ton.

DAVID B. PATTON ET AL., POTOMAC ECONOMICS, 2015 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR NEW
YORK ISO MARKETS (2016), https://perma.cc/72JG-DBFV(indicating that natural gas-fired resources
were the marginal source of supply in 67% of intervals).
187
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pricing scheme. We anticipate some re-ordering of resources, but cannot determine exactly how
the supply mix will change, and/or whether gas will remain at the margin. This will depend on a
number of factors, including each generator’s cost and emissions profile, as shown in the
simplified example above. Further complicating matters, there will likely also be a demand
response, which affects dispatch. For example, if higher prices reduce electricity demand, fewer
generating units may need to be dispatched, leading to a change in the marginal unit.188
In intervals when natural gas is at the margin, the market-clearing price would increase by
around $8, depending on the marginal generator’s actual emissions. Should coal be at the margin,
the market clearing price increase would be around $14. Each generator would receive the market
clearing price less their carbon fee. Thus, as the carbon fee is highest for fossil fuel generators, there
would be an incentive to increase investment in renewable and other low-carbon generation. In the
long-run, the market clearing price may decrease as the generating fleet becomes less carbonintensive and low- and zero-emitting generators are increasingly on the margin. Such a decrease
could be partially or wholly offset by increases to the carbon price. Such increases could cause the
market clearing price to rise over time.

6.5

Options for Re-distributing Revenues
To offset increased wholesale electricity prices, revenues generated through the carbon

pricing scheme should be reimbursed to LSEs and other buyers in an equitable manner. This could
be achieved in a number of ways. One option is to require LSEs to pay the full market-clearing
price, including the amount of any carbon fee. Each generator would receive that price, less their
unit specific carbon fee, which would be retained by NYISO. The retained funds could then be
refunded to LSEs in an equitable manner. States could direct LSEs to use the refunded amount to
mitigate end-customer bill impacts or fund state policy goals (e.g., energy efficiency investments).
Studies suggest that, where the refunds are passed through to customers, any increase in retail bills
is likely to be minimal. By way of example, Exelon estimated an increase in retail bills of just one to

For a discussion of this issue, see Jos Sijm et al., CO2 Cost Pass-Through and Windfall Profits in the
Power Sector, 6 CLIMATE POL’Y 49 (2006).
188
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two percent, assuming a carbon price of $20 per ton.189 Another study for the Clean Air Task Force
estimated that, with a carbon price of $34 per ton, bills would increase by four percent.190
Ideally, refunds to LSEs should not be tied to their specific purchases in energy markets, so
as to avoid dampening any demand response. 191 NYISO could, for example, provide periodic
refunds based on each LSE’s share of total load during the period. Refunds would not be tied to
LSEs’ actual share of carbon fees, meaning that all LSEs would receive the same amount per MWh
of electricity purchased, regardless of whether purchases are made during times of low or high
fees.
Similar refund schemes have been adopted by ISO/RTOs in other circumstances. By way of
example, since 2007, PJM has included the marginal cost of transmission line losses in energy
market prices.192 As marginal losses rise exponentially with transmission system flows, they exceed
average losses, resulting in PJM over-collecting revenues relative to costs.193 PJM refunds the excess
to buyers on a monthly basis, in proportion to each buyer’s MW usage, rather than its actual
contribution to the surplus funds.194 A similar marginal loss collection and refund scheme is used
by CAISO.195 Both the CAISO and PJM schemes have been approved by FERC; FERC’s approval of

Assuming the revenues from the carbon price were applied to retail bill relief programs. See
Comments of Exelon Corporation on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources (Dec. 1, 2014),
https://perma.cc/EK3C-3DPP.
189

BRUCE PHILLIPS, THE NORTHBRIDGE GROUP, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR REGULATING
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING POWER PLANTS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT:
PRACTICAL PATHWAYS TO MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS (2014), https://perma.cc/2QXX-MP33.
190

191

See supra part 6.4.

Atlantic City Electric Co. v. PJM Interconnection, 115 FERC ¶ 61,132 (2006). For a discussion of
this decision and its relevance to carbon pricing in wholesale electricity markets, see STEVEN
WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION: HOW THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION CAN USE ITS EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REDUCE
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND INCREASE CLEAN ENERGY USE 10-11 (2014),
https://perma.cc/LFV6-DZ3K.
192

193

Atlantic City Electric Co., 115 FERC ¶ 61,132 at P 4-5.

194

Atlantic City Electric Co., v. PJM Interconnection, 117 FERC ¶ 61,169 (2006).

California Independent System Operator, 116 FERC ¶ 61,274 (2006), order on reh’g, 119 FERC ¶
61,076 (2007).
195
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the PJM scheme has been upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.196
Some market participants have suggested that, rather than collecting and then refunding
carbon fees, ISO/RTOs should simply adjust the electricity prices paid by LSEs and other buyers.
NYISO could, for example, set a buyer price equal to the market-clearing price less the average
carbon fee for all dispatched generators (see example 3 below). This approach would dampen the
demand response to the carbon pricing scheme, as LSEs would face a lower price, compared to the
situation in which the adder is collected by NYISO.

6.6

Monitoring and Reporting
To successfully implement a carbon pricing scheme, data will be required on each

generator’s carbon dioxide emissions, so as to calculate the carbon fee to be added to its bids. The
required data is already recorded in the New York Generator Attribute Tracking System
(“NYGATS”). Maintained by NYSERDA, NYGATS is used to track the environmental attributes of
electricity generated within New York, as well as that imported to the state. For each MWh of

Black Oak Energy, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, U.S. App. LEXIS 16201 (D.C. Cir.
2013). FERC’s approval of the CAISO scheme was not appealed to the courts.
196
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electricity, NYGATS records the generation source (whether in or out of state) and key
characteristics of that source, including its carbon dioxide emissions rate. The emissions data is
entered by NYISO, based on reports filed by generators participating in its market.

7. DOES THE LAW PERMIT NYISO TO PRICE CARBON?
Any NYISO carbon pricing scheme would be subject to review by FERC. As explained in
part 3.3 above, under the FPA, FERC is responsible for overseeing wholesale electricity rates to
ensure they are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. The FPA requires
public utilities, including ISO/RTOs, to submit proposed changes to their rates or practices
affecting rates to FERC.197
FERC has traditionally shown great deference to ISO/RTOs to formulate market rules as
they see fit. 198 FERC may approve an amended NYISO tariff, establishing new market rules,
without finding that the existing tariff is deficient or that the amended tariff is somehow
superior.199 The applicable standard requires only that the amended tariff be just, reasonable, and
not unduly discriminatory or preferential.

7.1

Including a Carbon Price in Wholesale Electricity Rates is Just and
Reasonable
This sub-part presents two distinct lines of argument supporting the conclusion that carbon

pricing in NYISO markets is just and reasonable. The first is the bolder of the two and builds on
the premise that FERC has wide latitude to authorize a NYISO proposal aimed at improving the
functioning of its wholesale markets. The second resembles arguments made elsewhere for
adopting a wholesale carbon price because doing so reflects and rationalizes state public policy. As
noted in the introduction, though these arguments are distinct from one another, they are not
mutually exclusive. Importantly, these arguments are intended to justify inclusion of a carbon

197

16 U.S.C. § 824d(d).

Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest in
the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 555
(2007).
199 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).
198
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price of some sort in NYISO’s tariff and do not address the level at which any such price should be
set. That issue is discussed in part 7.1.3 below.
7.1.1 Argument 1: Improving the Functioning of Wholesale Markets Administered by NYISO
Argument 1(a): A carbon price would enhance competition in NYISO markets. As discussed
in part 3.3 above, FERC considers rates to be just and reasonable if they are set in well-functioning,
competitive wholesale energy markets. FERC regulates markets to mitigate the exercise of market
power and otherwise enhance competition, viewing such regulatory intervention as “integral to . . .
fulfilling its statutory mandate under the FPA to ensure supplies of electric energy at just [and]
reasonable” prices.200 FERC put this premise to the test in 2011 when, in Order 745,201 it required
ISO/RTOs to pay the full LMP to qualifying demand response resources on the grounds that
promoting “meaningful demand-side participation” in wholesale markets would increase
competition in those markets with salutary effects on prices.202 The Supreme Court ultimately
endorsed FERC’s logic in FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”).203
In upholding Order 745, the court in EPSA noted that FERC “undertakes to ensure just and
reasonable wholesale rates by enhancing competition – attempting . . . to break down regulatory
and economic barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale electricity.”204 The court emphasized
that Order 745 is intended “to improve how [the wholesale energy] market runs.”205 According to
the court, FERC’s “justifications for regulating demand response are all about, and only about
improving the wholesale market . . . FERC explained that demand response participation could
create a well-functioning competitive” market with reduced rates and enhanced reliability.206
The decision in EPSA suggests that FERC has broad authority to promote competition in
wholesale markets as a means of ensuring just and reasonable rates. Based on EPSA, at least two

200

Order No. 745, supra note 96, at 6.

201

Id.

202

Id. at 1.

203

EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2015).

204

Id. at 768.
Id. at 776.

205
206

Id. at 776–77.
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commentators have suggested that FERC could approve an ISO/RTO-proposed carbon price as just
and reasonable, so long as evidence demonstrated that the adder would enhance competition.207
Peskoe, who makes this argument in relation to ISO-NE, emphasizes that FERC’s approval “may
be on more solid legal ground” if the adder is designed to achieve specific competitive outcomes
which are independent of the environmental harm caused by carbon dioxide emissions.208 Thus
Peskoe stops short of endorsing what has been called “social-cost dispatch”—the adjustment of
market based rates so that they reflect social costs rather than private ones.209
Weissman and Webb, writing before the EPSA decision, argued that including the social cost
of carbon dioxide emissions in rates is necessary to enhance competition in wholesale markets:
[L]ess-polluting generators are placed at a competitive disadvantage when
more-polluting generators can mask the true cost of power by ignoring
externalities . . . The existence of environmental externalities represents [a]
kind of market failure to which FERC could . . . respond by adjusting the bid
price . . . [In doing so, FERC’s] objective would be to stimulate the
development of generating units that will impose the lowest cost on society
and remove [a] market distortion – the ability of some generators to undercut
their competitors by escaping responsibility for their environmental costs.210
This reasoning takes the characterization of environmental externalities as being outside of FERC’s
remit and stands it on its head. By Weissman and Webb’s logic, ignoring environmental
externalities means giving some market participants an unfair competitive advantage over others
and thereby impairing market competitiveness.

211

This view sees an analogy between

See, e.g., Ari Peskoe, Integrating Markets and Public Policy in New England 9 (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://perma.cc/MWY8-FQDK (stating that FERC could approve a carbon adder if it “can
conclude that there is adequate support in the record that [the] proposal furthers that goal” of
enhancing competition); Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49
U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1788 (2016) (“[FERC] can even take an ‘environmental’ action — such
as addressing climate change through a carbon adder — if it has a direct relationship to wholesale
rates.”).
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Peskoe, supra note 207, at 28.
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Bateman & Tripp, supra note 125, at 330.
WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 192, at 10 & 12.
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See Bateman & Tripp, supra note 125, at 304 (“by not incorporating GHG externalities into its rate
regulation, FERC influences decisions about what generation should be built just as much as it
would by incorporating these externalities. The effect of its exclusion of the externalities is simply
211
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compensating emitting- and non-emitting generators at the same rate and compensating generation
and demand response at different rates. FERC Order 745 eliminated the latter distinction on the
grounds that inadequate compensation inhibited wholesale market participation by demand
response resources, which in turn kept average rates higher than necessary and, more generally,
reduced competition in wholesale energy markets. In the case of a carbon price, FERC would be
acting to facilitate the participation of low-carbon generators that, like demand response resources,
are inadequately compensated for the services they provide because rates do not reflect their zeroemission attributes. Adopting a carbon price would ensure that rates more accurately reflect the
value that low- and high-carbon sources of electricity deliver and thus level the competitive
playing field.
The playing field is particularly skewed in NYISO markets, which are affected not only by
the current failure to internalize carbon externalities at the wholesale level, but also by state
policies adopted in more or less direct response to that failure. The policies, described in part 5
above, effectively attach a value to generators’ carbon-related attributes. They do not, however,
apply equally to all generators with the same attributes. Just seventy-six of New York’s roughly
170 fossil fuel generators have their carbon dioxide emissions priced through RGGI. Some lowcarbon generators that operate renewable energy sources are compensated for their zero-emission
attributes through REC sales. Such compensation is not, however, consistently available to nonrenewable low-carbon generators. Finally, three, but not all four, of the state’s nuclear generators
receive compensation from ZEC sales which is not available to renewable generators.
Due to their partial application, state policies provide only incomplete and inchoate remedies
for the market failure described above and arguably further distort the market, thereby impairing
effective competition among wholesale buyers and sellers. The policies give some market
participants a competitive advantage over others with the same attributes. RGGI, for example,
increases the costs faced by large fossil fuel generators due to the need to purchase emission
allowances. Those generators are, therefore, forced to bid into the market at higher prices. Smaller
fossil fuel generators (i.e., that are not subject to RGGI) can, however, continue making bids that

to give GHG-intensive generation, such as coal, an advantage vis-`a-vis cleaner energy, such as
wind.”).
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exclude the cost of emissions and thus undercut their competitors. Similarly, as a result of the CES,
nuclear power plants can undercut fossil fuel and other generators. The CES increases the return
nuclear power plants receive for electricity sold in wholesale markets, creating an incentive for
them to reduce their bids (i.e., to ensure they are dispatched) and thereby putting downward
pressure on market prices. This is likely to affect the financial viability of other generators, both
low-and high-carbon, impeding their ongoing participation in wholesale markets.
We note that some commentators have disputed FERC’s authority to adjust wholesale market
prices to internalize the external costs of carbon dioxide emissions. 212 Moot, for example, has
argued that such costs are fundamentally extrinsic to wholesale markets and thus beyond FERC’s
legal domain.213 He states:
FERC can remove barriers to participation by renewable resources in
wholesale power markets . . . if those barriers constitute an undue preference.
That preference must relate to a matter within FERC’s jurisdiction, however,
not a matter committed to the jurisdiction of other governmental bodies. Just
as the FERC cannot remedy perceived inequities in the tax code by
withholding wholesale market revenues from firms allegedly taking
advantage of tax loopholes, it cannot counteract Congress’ failure to enact
cap-and-trade legislation by creating its own program through a wholesale
market design change.214
In our view, however, FERC approval of a NYISO carbon price would not amount to an extension
of environmental policy by other means. Rather, it would be a logical application of the principles
that have long guided FERC’s management of wholesale markets. While we agree with Moot that
neither the FPA nor other federal legislation expressly authorizes FERC to address emissions, that
would not be FERC’s primary purpose in approving a carbon price. FERC’s purpose would be to
enhance wholesale market operations and promote competition, much as it has done in other
instances where it has lacked express legislative sanction but has proceeded anyway.215
Argument 1(b): A carbon pricing scheme would ensure proper wholesale price formation. In
considering FERC’s authority to approve a carbon pricing scheme following EPSA, it is important
212

See e.g. Moot, supra note 4.

213

Id. at 358 – 361.

214

Id. at 361.
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See supra part 2.1.
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to bear in mind the features of Order 745. Most notably, as the Supreme Court observed, the order
“is all about” reducing wholesale electricity prices.216 In contrast, a carbon pricing scheme is likely
to increase wholesale electricity prices, at least in the short-run.217 In the long-run, however, prices
should fall as the generating fleet becomes less carbon intensive.218 In contrast, from the start, the
costs of generation will likely fall. While electricity prices and costs are often assumed to be
equivalent, 219 in fact, costs currently exceed prices due to the presence of externalities. These
externalities reflect a cost to society—one that, in our view, must be incorporated into prices if they
are to provide clear signals to market participants and investors.
FERC has recently emphasized the importance of proper price formation to, among other
things, maximize market surplus and incentivize investment.220 According to FERC Commissioner
Cheryl LaFleur, to achieve these objectives, prices must “reflect the true cost of reliable
operations.” 221 The near-term effects of climate change—warmer ambient temperatures, heat
waves, less reliable access to water, and more frequent and intense storms—have clear import for
system reliability. These effects will impair generation and transmission facility efficiency, 222

EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774. As noted above, Order 745 aims to promote the participation of demand
response resources in wholesale markets by compensating them at the full LMP. Such
compensation is, however, only required where resources pass a net benefits test indicating that
their dispatch will result in lower wholesale prices (i.e., compared to if all load was met with
generation).
216

217

See supra section 6.4.

Id.
In EPSA the court uses the terms “price” and “cost” interchangeably. Compare EPSA, 136 S. Ct.
at 778 (indicating that “wholesale market operators accept demand response bids only if those
offers lower the wholesale price” (emphasis added)) and 782 (stating operators will accept a bid “so
long as that bid can satisfy a “net benefits test” – meaning that it is sure to bring down costs”
(emphasis added)).
218
219

FERC Notice Inviting Post-Technical Workshop Comments (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://perma.cc/9PMZ-NA5B.
220

Transcript of Hearing: Price Formation in Energy and Auxiliary Services Markets Operated by
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators (Dec. 9, 2014),
https://perma.cc/YAM8-L6FE.
221

See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 10 (2013), https://perma.cc/62TQ-VUCN (indicating that, in
natural gas and coal units, ”heat is used to produce high-pressure steam, which is expanded over a
222
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undermining reliability and creating costs, which must be reflected in prices so as to provide
correct incentives for investment in new facilities. Put another way: climate change is imposing
costs on the electric grid and its end users that wholesale markets currently interpret as noise
rather than signal; carbon pricing would serve to translate that signal into price effects and thereby
more accurately reflect the value that high- and low-carbon sources of electricity deliver.
FERC has recently taken steps to ensure that market prices more fully account for the cost of
generation. In Order 825, for example, FERC directed market operators to implement various
reforms aimed at ensuring prices more accurately reflect energy and reserve shortages223 so that
generators “are compensated for the value of the service that they provide” and thus face the
correct incentives to invest in enhancing reliability.224 While Order 825 relates to the pricing of
features endogenous to wholesale markets, FERC has also dealt with exogenous features in the
past. FERC has previously adjusted wholesale market prices to achieve public policy objectives
such as reduced transmission line losses.225 In 2006 FERC ordered PJM to include an uplift charge equal to the marginal cost of line losses—in wholesale prices to cover the cost of energy lost during
transmission. According to Weissman and Webb:
turbine to produce electricity. The driving force for the process is the phase change of the steam to
a liquid following the turbine . . . A vacuum is created in the condensation process that draws the
steam over the turbine. This low pressure is critical to the thermodynamic efficiency of the process.
Increased backpressure will lower the efficiency of the generation process. Increases in ambient air
temperatures and cooling water temperatures will increase steam condensate temperatures and
turbine backpressure, reducing power generation efficiency.”). See also SOFIA AIVALIOTI, SABIN CTR.
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, ELECTRICITY SECTOR ADAPTATION TO HEAT WAVES (2015),
https://perma.cc/93FG-8NHF; Order Approving Electric, Gas and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with
Joint Proposal (Feb. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/RCU5-ZKQS.

FERC noted that “some RTOs/ISOs currently restrict the use of shortage pricing to certain causes
of shortages, or some RTOs/ISOs requires a shortage to exist for a minimum amount of time before
triggering shortage pricing.” See Order No. 825, supra note 98, at 58. FERC determined that
“existing shortage pricing triggers that do not invoke shortage pricing when there is a shortage
(regardless of duration or cause) are unjust and unreasonable.” Id. at 60. FERC therefore required
“each RTO/ISO to trigger shortage pricing for any interval in which a shortage of energy or
operating reserves is indicated.” Id. at 90.
223

224

Id. at 7.

225

For a discussion of this issue, see WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 192, at 10-11.
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FERC’s decision to require marginal loss pricing was made on policy
grounds and aimed to ensure that prices provide the strongest signal possible
to encourage more efficient use of the transmission system . . . FERC
emphasized that use of this methodology would reduce electricity supply
costs and thereby increase electricity market efficiency [stating]: “by
changing to the marginal losses method, PJM would change the way that it
dispatches generators by considering the effects of [transmission line] losses.
As a result . . . the total cost of meeting load would be reduced” (internal
citations omitted).226
Just as line losses create a burden for buyers and sellers of electricity, justifying market rule
adjustments, so too do carbon dioxide emissions and associated climate change. Both lead to
reduced system reliability and thus increased costs for market participants. Adopting a carbon
price would internalize the external costs of emissions, ensuring that they are taken into account
by market operators when dispatching generators, and thereby causing electricity demand to be
served by the lowest cost resources.
7.1.2 Argument 2: Ensuring orderly development of the electric system
Argument 2(a): Wholesale carbon pricing reflective of diverse state policies would, in the
short-run, harmonize those policies. As discussed in part 3.3, in exercising its authority to set just
and reasonable rates, FERC must balance the interests of suppliers and customers.227 FERC must
also ensure protection of the public interest.228 This does not, however, give FERC “a broad license
to promote the general public welfare.”229 Rather, as the Supreme Court has observed, it “is a
charge to promote the orderly production of plentiful supplies of electric energy” at reasonable
prices.230 Achieving this goal in the age of climate change means ensuring that prices provide

226
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Weissman & Webb, supra note 192, at 10-11.
Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603.

See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) (declaring that
“the purpose of the power given the Commission by § 206(a) [i.e., to set just and reasonable rates]
is the protection of the public interest”).
229 Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669
(1972).
230 Id.
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appropriate signals for investment in low-carbon generation consistent with state policy.231 In the
short run, this means rationalizing the current patchwork of carbon-related electricity pricing
policies in New York. In the long run, it means ensuring that market participants align their plans
with existing and foreseeable future legal requirements.232
Some but not all NYISO market participants are subject to state policies aimed at supporting
the transition to low-carbon electricity generation. As discussed in part 7.1.1 above, the patchwork
of state policies provides partial coverage of New York generators with respect to carbon
emissions. It also imposes diverse price levels on those emissions or their absence: REC values
derive from an independent market whose participants must comply with the state’s RPS; ZEC
values derive from a formula derived from the SCC; and RGGI allowance prices derive from an
interstate allowance-trading market. As of January 2017, REC purchasers paid $21.16 per MWh,233
ZEC purchasers $17.54 per MWh,234 and RGGI participants $3.55 per short ton of carbon dioxide,
which translates to about $2.17/MWh for natural gas-fired generators and $3.67 for bituminous
coal-fired ones.235
Partial coverage and diverse pricing complicates and distorts the values transmitted via
wholesale electricity markets to participants, thereby impairing efficient planning and investment.
This situation is ripe for improvement via the sort of rationalization that a more uniformly
applicable wholesale carbon price would provide.
Argument 2(b): Wholesale carbon pricing reflective of state-level public policy would
improve long-run planning. A harmonizing wholesale carbon price would also help ensure orderly
electric system development over the long-term. New York policy-makers responsible for the
See generally Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (Dec.
2016), https://perma.cc/W45A-NH47 (characterizing categories of investment risk arising from
climate change).
232 See Peskoe, supra note 207, at 16–17, 24 (discussing FERC’s authority to ground decisions in
expectations about expected future policy choices).
233 New York State, Clean Energy Standard: REC and ZEC Purchases from NYSERDA,
https://perma.cc/QVC9-89VC (last visited Jan. 30, 2017)
234 Id.
235 See EIA, Frequently Asked Questions: How much carbon dioxide is produced per kilowatthour when
generating electricity with fossil fuels?, https://perma.cc/7FPM-NYPU (last updated Feb. 29, 2016)
(indicating that natural gas emits, on average, 1.22 pounds of CO2 per kWh, and bituminous coal
emits 2.07).
231
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electric grid have long recognized the need to mitigate climate change and have embodied that
goal in a variety of policies. Achieving the state’s climate change mitigation goals, such as the 40 by
30 goal, will require replacing a significant volume of fossil-fueled generation with energy
efficiency and zero-emitting resources, which will in turn require expanding transmission capacity
and making changes to bulk power system operations. Planning must begin now if New York and
NYISO are to minimize the impact of these changes on electric system reliability while ensuring
continued availability of plentiful supplies of electricity at reasonable rates.
FERC has previously taken steps to improve electric system planning, including by adopting
Order 1000, which requires Transmission Owners ” to develop a regional transmission plan that
reflects the evaluation of whether alternative regional solutions may be more efficient or costeffective” than local solutions.236 Specifically, Order 1000 requires Transmission Owners seeking to
develop new transmission facilities to participate in a regional planning process, which:
(1) considers “transmission needs driven by public policy requirements established by” enacted
statutes or regulations,237 and allows for consideration of transmission needs driven by public
policy objectives not codified in existing laws;238 and
(2) gives “comparable consideration” to transmission and non-transmission alternatives—a
category that includes storage, energy efficiency, distributed energy resources, and demand
response.
Adoption of a NYISO carbon price reflective of state-level public policies would promote the
same goals as Order 1000, albeit on different legal grounds. Specifically, it would embody New
York’s policies with respect to climate change mitigation and adaptation, including those not yet
codified, in a way that directly informs bulk power system planning—a potentially important

Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 (Jul. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Order No. 1000].
236

237

Id. at 9.

Id. at 168; see also Shelly Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 481–
86 (2015) (describing examples of planning pursuant to Order 1000 that fail to realize that Order’s
stated aims).
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corrective, given the ambition of New York’s 40 by 30 goal239 and the fact that uncodified policies
are often ignored by transmission operators in their planning processes.240
Similarly, a wholesale carbon price would also push in the same direction as Order 1000’s
“comparable consideration” requirement. This requirement was intended to ensure that
investments in transmission—which are always costly and long-lived—are not made before due
consideration is given to potentially more efficient and cost-effective alternative approaches.241
Despite this, however, regional transmission planning efforts still typically focus on how to
develop transmission and largely or completely ignore the question of whether non-transmission
alternatives might contribute to a more optimal solution, either by supplanting transmission
facilities or enabling more cost-effective routes or combinations of transmission and alternatives.242
The state’s “Reforming the Energy Vision” initiative, adopted to further progress towards the 40
by 30 goal, includes support for energy efficiency, distributed generation, and other nontransmission alternatives. The NYPSC is working to ensure that retail electricity markets operate in
a way that is consistent with and furthers investment in these alternatives. A wholesale carbon

New York State Energy Planning Board, The Energy to Lead: 2015 New York State Energy Plan
vol. 1, at 45 (2015), https://perma.cc/Q8J5-QRE4 (stating that goal of energy efficiency reductions of
600 trillion BTU in buildings would mean a twenty-three percent reduction by 2030 from a 2012
baseline).
239

See, e.g., WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 192, at 36 (finding that “[w]hile some transmission
operators have voluntarily elected to consider additional policy objectives not codified in existing
laws and regulations, most have not”). But see, CDP, supra note 178, at 40 (indicating that some
electric utilities have begun considering “the potential future policy and regulatory risk associated
with carbon [dioxide] emissions” in their planning processes).
240

Order No. 1000, supra note 236, at 38-50; see also Scott Hempling, ‘Non-Transmission Alternatives’:
FERC’s ‘Comparable Consideration’ Needs Correction, ELEC. POL’Y 9 (May 2013),
https://perma.cc/SKR5-TY8S (“It is not prudent for a public utility not to consider all feasible
alternatives. The costs that emerge from an imprudent process—one that ignores alternatives—
cannot be reasonable costs.”).
241

Welton, supra note 238, at 481–86 (illustrating with examples how Order 1000 has failed to
realize its stated aims); Interview of Allen Gleckner, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, Univ. of
Minn., 10–11 (June 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/LRT5-HPCB (“a problem with transmission planning
nation-wide is how non-transmission alternatives are looked at . . . Right now there are a few
different wonky reasons why it’s not being fully looked at on a level playing field with the
transmission proposals”).
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price would reflect this purpose by pushing stakeholders to more thoroughly examine nontransmission alternatives.243
7.1.3 Carbon Prices Aligned to Arguments 1 and 2
Parts 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 above present various arguments in support of carbon pricing in NYISO .
Design of the pricing scheme and the pricing level depends heavily on which of those arguments
NYISO relies upon:


Argument 1(a), which emphasizes the need to internalize carbon externalities to improve
wholesale market competitiveness, logically corresponds to a carbon price based on the SCC.
As explained in part 6.1 the SCC is an approximation of the damage to social welfare resulting
from carbon dioxide emissions. Its use would, therefore, ensure that the external costs of
emissions from fossil fuel generation are reflected in electricity prices which, in our view, is
necessary to level the playing field for non-fossil generators and thus improve the functioning
of wholesale markets.



Argument 1(b), which focuses on the costs fossil fuel generation imposes on the electric system,
e.g., in terms of reduced reliability, would not justify adoption of a carbon price based on the
SCC. As the SCC is a measure of the economy-wide cost of carbon dioxide emissions, its use
would overstate the reliability and other electric system costs of such emissions. We are not
aware of an analysis that traces cost causation from generators to end-users, but we are
confident that it could be done by examining carefully the effects on reliability and resiliency of
particular fuel and facility types.244



Argument 2, which emphasizes the need to improve short- and long-run electric system
planning, would arguably justify use of a price derived from the SCC as the basis for a scheme
that harmonized various state-level public policies. Underlying this argument is a concern that
current and future state policies aimed at addressing climate change will necessitate a shift
away from carbon-intensive generation. NYISO’s adoption of a carbon pricing scheme derived

Cf. NYISO, Distributed Energy Resources Roadmap for New York’s Wholesale Electricity
Markets (Draft) (Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y87U-UVBG.
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For a discussion of service reliability studies, see MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN ET AL., ERNEST ORLANDO
LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY, UPDATED VALUE OF SERVICE RELIABILITY ESTIMATES
FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY CUSTOMERS IN THE U.S. (2015), https://perma.cc/6M6Y-6KDA.
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from the SCC, which is already a touchstone for New York public policy, would help ensure
that market participants plan for that shift now.

7.2

A NYISO Carbon Price Would Not Be Unduly Discriminatory
FERC cannot approve a utility tariff that it finds to be unduly discriminatory in the sense of

“grant[ing] any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject[ing] any person to any
undue prejudice or disadvantage or . . . maintain[ing] any unreasonable difference in rates.”245 This
was historically assessed on a customer-specific basis, with FERC requiring utilities to offer like
rates, calculated on a cost-of-service basis, to all similarly situated customers. More recently, with
the shift to market-based rates, FERC has undertaken a broader inquiry, focusing on whether
market conditions are discriminatory. As Eisen has observed, “[i]nstead of judging whether an
individual firm’s action is . . . discriminatory, [FERC] decides whether features of the wholesale
markets’ operation contribute to [this] effect.”246
Some commentators have suggested that a carbon pricing scheme could be viewed as
discriminatory.247 Peskoe, for example, has noted that opponents of carbon pricing may argue that
it favors some generators over others.248 We recognize, as Peskoe does, that carbon pricing will
necessarily treat generators differently based on their emissions profiles.249 This is because, while
the same carbon price would be applied to all generating units, regardless of technology, the
resulting carbon fee would differ based on each unit’s emissions.250 Some may, therefore, view
carbon pricing as supporting renewable generating units at the expense of fossil fuel power plants.
That is not necessarily the case, however. Some renewable generators (e.g., using biofuels) produce
emissionswhich would be subject to carbon pricing . Those generators would face a higher carbon
fee than fossil fuel plants with low or zero-emissions (e.g., clean coal facilities).

16 U.S.C. § 824d(b).
Eisen, supra note 207, at 1812.
247 See e.g., Peskoe, supra note 207, at 26.
248 Id. (stating “opponents of carbon adder may argue that an adder would be contrary to FERC’s
longstanding policy of not favoring particular types of electric generation”).
249 Id. (noting that “A carbon adder . . . is essentially a payment from owners of emitting resources
to owners of emission-free resources. By definition, such a fee discriminates. Whether that
discrimination is ‘undue’ is a separate matter”).
250 See supra part 6.
245
246
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Despite the fact that it applies different fees to each generator, in our view, carbon pricing
does not violate the prohibition on undue discrimination in the FPA. Differential treatment is
permitted under the FPA if FERC “offer[s] a valid reason for the disparity . . . [which is related] to
the achievement of permissible policy goals.”251 With respect to a carbon price, NYISO may argue
that disparate treatment of low- and high-carbon generators is necessary to improve the
functioning of wholesale electricity markets, a long-accepted policy goal. A similar argument,
albeit in a different context, was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Wisconsin Public Power, Inc. v. FERC (“WPP”).252 That case involved a FERC decision
exempting certain transmission providers from compliance with MISO’s OATT on the basis that
they provided services under contracts pre-dating MISO’s formation. The court noted that FERC’s
decision “was in some loose sense discriminatory” as the exempt providers were not subject to
certain fees levied on others and could schedule services on short notice with greater flexibility.253
The court concluded, however, that the discrimination was not undue as it was necessary to solve
a specific problem in the market stating:
MISO’s development was complicated by the existence of several hundred
pre-existing bilateral contracts between its transmission owners and other
utilities. These long-term contracts, known as grandfathered agreements
(GFAs), obligated the transmission owners to provide transmission service
under terms and rates that were inconsistent with the OATT . . . The tension
between GFA terms and practices on the one hand and the MISO Tariff on
the other hand was from the very beginning a fundamental problem in the
proposed design and operation of MISO . . . [The] discrimination
[complained of] was inherent in the solution to [that] problem.254
A carbon price would also address a fundamental problem in the design and operation of
wholesale electricity markets. As explained above, the problem arises from the failure of markets
to accurately value low- and high-carbon sources of electricity, which impairs competition. This
problem is particularly acute in NYISO markets, which have been further distorted by state laws
that impose diverse carbon prices on some but not all market participants. Extending carbon

Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Wis. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
253 Id. at 274.
254 Id. at 249, 270, 274.
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pricing to all participants would remedy this distortion. To the extent that this results in
differential treatment of participants, it is “inherent in the solution” to the problem at hand, and
thus not undue under the test articulated in WPP.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that those benefiting from the extension of
carbon pricing account for a relatively small share of generation. The key beneficiaries of carbon
pricing are, of course, zero-carbon generating units. Most of those units already have their zerocarbon attributes valued through New York’s CES. The remaining zero-carbon generators serve a
relatively small share of electricity load. This is significant as, in WPP, the court emphasized that
the limited extent of discrimination suggested it was not undue.255 In that case, those benefiting
from the discriminatory practices accounted for approximately ten percent of peak load.256

8. CONCLUSION
In response to federal and state policies aimed at limiting the electricity sector’s carbon
dioxide emissions, several ISO/RTOs have commenced reviews into whether and how to price
carbon in wholesale energy markets. With some notable exceptions, emissions are not currently
priced in wholesale markets, but rather treated as externalities. This results in a mismatch between
the price and cost of fossil fuel generation which leads to higher levels of such generation than are
socially optimal. To correct this market failure and equalize prices with costs, an ISO/RTO could
include a carbon fee reflecting each generator’s emissions profile in its bids into the wholesale
market. By causing high emitting generators, such as coal- and oil-fired units, to be dispatched less
frequently, this would provide an incentive for investment in cleaner generating options and in
non-transmission alternatives like energy efficiency or demand response.
Although the carbon pricing scheme we propose is conceptually simple, its implementation
would raise numerous and complex issues. In the New York context, for example, any carbon
pricing scheme proposed by NYISO would have to be integrated with RGGI. Thus, after
determining a carbon fee for each generator—a difficult task in itself—NYISO would need to

255
256

Id. at 274 (noting that “the extent of discrimination was relatively small and not ‘undue’”).
Id. at 270.
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adjust that fee to exclude the cost of RGGI allowances. NYISO would also need to resolve whether
the fee should accommodate or displace Tier 3 of the CES.
NYISO’s proposed carbon pricing scheme would be subject to review by FERC. This paper
argued that a carbon price could be justified as a means of improving the functioning of wholesale
markets to ensure just and reasonable rates. While we view this as fully consistent with the law
and with long-standing FERC practice, we note that it would push the boundaries of what has
been done in the past. A more modest approach would see carbon pricing used solely to reflect
and harmonize state-level policies aimed at reducing electricity sector emissions.
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